State Of Washington v. Ricardo Liard Bruno, 74647-2

Ricardo Bruno was convicted by a jury of second-degree rape of his stepdaughter Y.H., a minor; the jury found the offense was domestic violence and part of an ongoing pattern of abuse.
The State sought to calculate Bruno’s offender score using an out-of-state (Georgia) robbery conviction, arguing it merited two felony points. The court instead should have treated that conviction as comparable to Washington first-degree theft (one point).
At sentencing the trial court calculated an offender score of two (standard range 95–125 months) and imposed an exceptional upward sentence of 180 months to life, citing additional aggravating factors that were not submitted to or found by the jury.
The court also imposed multiple community custody conditions, including a 10 p.m.–5 a.m. curfew, broad prohibitions on sexually explicit/erotic materials, and a ban on entering “any places where minors congregate.”
On appeal the court considered (1) miscalculation of offender score, (2) use of judge-found aggravating facts to justify an exceptional sentence (Blakely/Apprendi issue), and (3) vagueness and crime-relatedness of several community custody conditions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Bruno)	Held
Offender score: treatment of Georgia robbery	Georgia robbery is legally comparable to WA robbery → two points	Georgia conviction is legally comparable to WA 1st-degree theft → one point	Court: error; Georgia conviction comparable to WA 1st-degree theft; offender score = 1
Exceptional upward sentence based on judge-found aggravators	Court’s oral findings justified upward sentence; remand unnecessary	Reliance on aggravating facts not found by jury violated Sixth Amendment	Court: violated Apprendi/Blakely; remand for resentencing considering only jury-found enhancement
Vagueness: prohibition on "places where minors congregate"	Drafting provided sufficient context with illustrative list	Language is too broad and gives inadequate notice	Court: phrase is unconstitutionally vague; strike that clause but keep specific list (parks/playgrounds/schools)
Crime-relatedness & vagueness: curfew and sexually explicit materials ban	Materials ban is related to sexual offense; curfew permissible	Curfew and overly broad ban are not crime-related; materials ban is vague	Court: curfew (10–5) is not crime-related → strike; ban on erotica/sexual depictions of minors is crime-related; prohibition of all "sexually explicit material" under RCW 9.68.130 may be unsupported — either do further fact-finding or strike that portion

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (facts increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum must be found by jury)
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (same; judge-found facts cannot increase sentence beyond jury verdict)
State v. Morley, 134 Wn.2d 588 (two-step test for comparing out-of-state convictions)
State v. Hagar, 158 Wn.2d 369 (exceptional sentence and jury-found-facts requirement)
State v. Parker, 132 Wn.2d 182 (remand required when standard range miscalculated before exceptional sentence)
State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739 (vagueness and First Amendment implications for custody conditions)
State v. Collicott, 118 Wn.2d 649 (standard range determination depends on correct offender score)
State v. Irwin, 191 Wn. App. 655 (community custody conditions — vagueness and crime-relatedness analysis)