State Of Washington v. Pedro Karnaz Crenshaw
74364-3
Wash. Ct. App.May 1, 2017Background
- On September 12, 2013, Pedro Crenshaw drove at very high speed on a rural two‑lane road, missed a curve, ran through fences and collided with parked vehicles; he fled the scene and was later found by neighbors saying, "I killed my buddy."
- The passenger, Juan Quintanilla, suffered catastrophic injuries: loss of his left eye and teeth, severed left ear canal, severed facial nerve producing permanent left‑side facial paralysis, significant facial disfigurement, and a brain injury requiring extensive surgeries and rehabilitation.
- Police arrested Crenshaw, smelled alcohol, and obtained a warrantless blood draw about three hours after the collision; the blood alcohol concentration was .089.
- At trial, a jury convicted Crenshaw of vehicular assault, hit and run injury accident, and hit and run unattended vehicle, and found an aggravating circumstance that the victim’s injuries substantially exceeded the level required for vehicular assault; the court imposed a 36‑month sentence.
- On appeal Crenshaw raised (for the first time) that the warrantless blood draw lacked exigent circumstances, argued ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to move to suppress, challenged sufficiency and vagueness of the aggravator finding, and contended the sentence was excessive.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Crenshaw) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Warrantless blood draw admissibility | Blood evidence admissible; police acted reasonably under time pressure | No exigent circumstances justified a warrantless blood draw; evidence should be suppressed | Not reviewed on appeal: Crenshaw failed to preserve issue and did not show actual prejudice so exception to preservation (RAP 2.5(a)(3)) does not apply |
| Ineffective assistance for failure to move to suppress | Even without BAC evidence, other evidence of intoxication and reckless driving would support convictions | Counsel deficient for not moving to suppress blood evidence; prejudice resulted | Failed: record insufficient to show motion would have been granted and, even if suppressed, no prejudice given other evidence of intoxication and reckless driving |
| Sufficiency of evidence for aggravating circumstance (injuries "substantially exceeded") | Jury properly convicted and found aggravator based on severe, permanent injuries | Injuries did not substantially exceed statutory threshold for vehicular assault | Affirmed: evidence (loss of eye, permanent disfigurement, nerve severance, brain injury, permanent disability) supports finding that injuries substantially exceeded statutory level |
| Vagueness of RCW 9.94A.535(3)(y) (aggravator) | Statute and instructions are unconstitutionally vague | Statute is a sentencing guideline aggravator; vagueness challenge is unavailable | Rejected: State v. Baldwin precludes vagueness review of aggravating‑circumstance sentencing statutes |
| Excessive sentence (36 months) | Sentence is supported by aggravator and facts; court applied tenable reasons | Sentence is excessive and shocks the conscience | Affirmed: sentence based on tenable grounds and not so lengthy as to shock the conscience |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Baldwin, 150 Wn.2d 448 (2003) (aggravating‑circumstance sentencing statutes not subject to vagueness analysis)
- State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322 (1995) (standards for ineffective assistance and preservation of suppression claims)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (Sixth Amendment principles concerning judge‑found facts increasing sentences)
- State v. Pappas, 176 Wn.2d 188 (2012) (analysis of "substantially exceed" aggravating circumstance in sentencing)
- State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682 (1988) (preservation and "manifest error" standard under RAP 2.5)