State Of Washington v. Navarone Gregory Randmel
73531-4
Wash. Ct. App.Nov 14, 2016Background
- In Dec 2014–Jan 2015 Bellingham police linked Randmel to multiple stolen vehicles; he was twice seen driving stolen cars and fled; a third incident ended when a K-9 caught him and he was Mirandized at the scene.
- Randmel waived Miranda initially and spoke to Officer Douglas; later at the hospital Officer Woodward questioned him about prior K-9 tracks and Randmel twice said he "would rather not say," then made statements confirming aspects of the tracks.
- Randmel testified at trial claiming an alibi for the first two incidents and limited involvement in the third (taking boots only).
- Charged with three counts of possession of a stolen vehicle, two counts of resisting arrest, and one count of obstructing an officer; the trial court admitted Randmel’s hospital statements after a CrR 3.5 hearing and a jury convicted him on all counts.
- The trial court imposed approximately $2,250 in discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs) without conducting an individualized inquiry into Randmel’s ability to pay; Randmel was later found indigent for appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Randmel) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether including a definitional list of means of "possession" in the to-convict instruction required the State to prove every listed method | The instruction simply defined possession; the State need only prove the statutory elements of single-means crime | The added definitional alternatives created extra elements the State failed to prove, requiring reversal | Court: Followed Musacchio/Tyler—sufficiency is measured against statutory elements; no requirement to prove every definitional method; conviction affirmed |
| Whether Randmel unequivocally invoked his Miranda right to remain silent, making subsequent questioning and statements inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment | Officers reasonably continued questioning because invocation was equivocal; admission proper | Randmel argued "would rather not say" was an unequivocal invocation and subsequent statements should be suppressed | Court: Invocation was equivocal; under federal law officers need not stop; statements admissible |
| Whether Washington Constitution (art. I, §9) requires broader protection than the Fifth Amendment when invocation is equivocal | State argued no broader protection (Earls/Horton) and federal standard applies | Randmel urged a Gunwall analysis to show state constitution offers greater protection, requiring officers to stop except to clarify | Court: Performed limited Gunwall analysis (factors 4 and 6) and concluded no persuasive basis to expand state protection here; federal standard controls |
| Whether prosecutor’s closing comment referring to Randmel’s refusal to answer certain questions improperly commented on silence | State: references described testimony and were not a comment on exercise of right; no contemporaneous objection | Randmel: comment penalized his invocation of rights and was improper | Court: No error—he did not validly invoke the right; claim not preserved; remarks permissible as references to testimony |
Key Cases Cited
- Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709 (2016) (jury instructions that add an extra element do not change the sufficiency inquiry, which looks to statutory elements)
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (invocation of right to remain silent must be unequivocal; officer need not cease questioning on equivocal remarks)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (clarifies standard for ambiguous invocations of right to counsel; reasonable officer standard)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation requires warnings; waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent)
- State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24 (1994) (Gunwall framework and limits on treating state constitution as broader than federal protections)
- Gunwall v. State, 106 Wn.2d 1 (1986) (six-factor test for determining whether state constitution affords greater protection than federal counterpart)
- State v. Piatnitsky, 180 Wn.2d 407 (2014) (discusses standards for Miranda waiver and invocation under Washington law)
- State v. Tyler, 195 Wn. App. 385 (2016) (applies Musacchio to hold that including multiple means in instruction does not add elements the State must prove)
- State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827 (2015) (trial courts must make individualized inquiry into defendant's current and future ability to pay before imposing discretionary LFOs)
