State Of Washington v. Michael William Bienhoff
75310-0
| Wash. Ct. App. | Nov 6, 2017Background
- In 2012 Michael Bienhoff shot and killed Precious Reed during an attempted purchase of marijuana; a jury convicted Bienhoff of first-degree murder and he was sentenced to life without parole.
- The State sought over $40,000 in restitution: $34,250 for wage-replacement benefits paid from the Crime Victims' Compensation Fund and $6,130 for burial and funeral costs (of which the Department of Labor & Industries paid $5,750 and a private individual paid $379.89).
- Defendants argued Reed was ineligible for crime victims' compensation because RCW 7.68.061 bars benefits when the victim was committing or attempting to commit a felony; therefore, they contended the State could not seek reimbursement of funds the Department paid.
- The trial court declined to order restitution for wage-replacement benefits but ordered restitution for the entire funeral/burial amount, including the portion paid by the Department.
- Bienhoff appealed only the restitution order challenging the court’s authority to require repayment of amounts the Department had paid from the crime victims’ compensation fund.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Bienhoff) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a trial court may order restitution to reimburse burial/funeral costs paid by the Dept. of Labor & Industries | Restitution may be ordered for readily ascertainable burial/funeral costs causally connected to the crime, even if the Dept. paid part from the crime victims’ fund. | Restitution cannot include amounts the Department paid because the victim was ineligible for crime victims’ benefits under RCW 7.68.061; thus the Dept. had no right to reimbursement. | Affirmed — restitution for the full funeral/burial costs (including Dept. payments) was authorized under RCW 9.94A.753(5). |
| Whether subsection (7) of RCW 9.94A.753 (special rule for crime victims' compensation) limits subsection (5) restitution | Subsection (7) is an additional remedy for the Department but does not restrict subsection (5); subsection (5) independently authorizes restitution to third-party payors when causal standards are met. | The Dept.'s payments are recoverable only if subsection (7)'s requirements are satisfied; otherwise restitution is improper. | Held that subsections (5) and (7) are distinct; subsection (5) can require restitution to reimbursers even if subsection (7) criteria are not met. |
| Whether restitution must be denied because the Dept. erroneously paid benefits to an ineligible victim | The payment by the Dept. substituted for direct loss to the victim’s family; denying restitution would let the offender escape consequences for losses that would otherwise exist. | Departmental payment errors bar restitution to the State/Dept. | Court followed precedent permitting restitution to third-party payors (e.g., employers, insurers); ordered restitution despite Dept.'s payment. |
| Whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in ordering full funeral restitution | The sentencing court properly applied RCW 9.94A.753(5) and did not rely on an erroneous legal standard. | Ordering repayment of Dept. amounts was an abuse of discretion and misapplication of law. | No abuse of discretion; restitution order stands. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Davison, 116 Wn.2d 917 (1991) (permits restitution to third-party payor where paying the victim substituted for direct loss)
- State v. Kinneman, 155 Wn.2d 272 (2005) (indirect victims’ losses may be subject to restitution)
- State v. McCarthy, 178 Wn. App. 290 (2013) (discusses distinctions between subsections of restitution statute and standards of causation)
- State v. Ewing, 102 Wn. App. 349 (2000) (upheld restitution to insurer that paid victim’s claims)
- State v. Blanchfield, 126 Wn. App. 235 (2005) (restatement of restitution statutory framework and duty to order restitution absent extraordinary circumstances)