State Of Washington v. Michael Sean Stanley, 75223-5

Michael Stanley, who had done yard work for H.J., was charged with first-degree burglary (sexual motivation) and second-degree rape by forcible compulsion after H.J. reported he approached her from behind, covered her mouth, ordered her to remove clothing, attempted penetration, and she resisted and later called police.
At trial Stanley proposed WPIC 18.25, an instruction stating evidence of consent may be considered in determining forcible compulsion, but the court declined to give it for lack of sufficient evidence of consent.
The jury convicted Stanley on the charged offenses; he appealed arguing the refusal to give the consent instruction violated his due process rights.
The central factual dispute on appeal concerned whether any evidence (e.g., silence of a downstairs subletter, lack of forced entry, absence of DNA) rose to the level of creating a factual issue of consent at the time of the act.
The trial court found and the Court of Appeals agreed that none of the proffered facts constituted "actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement" to intercourse at the time of the act, so the consent instruction was properly withheld.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court erred by refusing WPIC 18.25 (consent instruction)	State: forcible compulsion presumes nonconsent; no instruction needed absent evidence of consent	Stanley: refusal denied his due process right to present his theory; evidence (silence of subletter, no forced entry, lack of DNA, post‑event conduct) supported giving instruction	Court: no abuse of discretion — insufficient evidence of consent; forcible compulsion encompasses nonconsent so instruction properly withheld
Whether evidence the subletter did not hear screams supports a reasonable inference of consent	State: silence does not equal affirmative consent	Stanley: subletter’s silence undermines complainant’s account and supports consent inference	Court: subletter’s limited, impaired observation only shows silence/impeachment potential, not affirmative consent; not enough to require instruction
Whether absence of forced entry or DNA supports consent inference	State: irrelevant to consent to intercourse at the time of the act	Stanley: absence suggests consent	Court: absence of forced entry speaks only to entry consent, not sexual consent; lack of DNA irrelevant to consent determination
Whether the court should award appellate costs to the State	State: seek costs if appeal fails	Stanley: is indigent	Court: decline to award costs; record shows presumption of continued indigency

State v. W.R., 181 Wn.2d 757, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014) (holding that consent to intercourse negates the element of forcible compulsion and the State must prove nonconsent; defendant need only produce evidence to raise reasonable doubt on consent)
Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 133 S. Ct. 714, 184 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2013) (clarifies burden allocation limits where a defense necessarily negates an element)
State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006) (discusses burden and instruction standards for defenses in sexual offense cases)
State v. Walker, 136 Wn.2d 767, 966 P.2d 883 (1998) (standards for reviewing instructional rulings and jury instruction sufficiency)
State v. Nolan, 141 Wn.2d 620, 8 P.3d 300 (2000) (addresses appellate discretion regarding assessment of costs and indigency presumptions)