State of Washington v. Margaret J. Grinstead
34349-9
| Wash. Ct. App. | Jun 6, 2017Background
- Margaret Grinstead, a Canadian citizen and U.S. lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty (Alford plea) to third-degree theft (a gross misdemeanor) in 2010 and was sentenced to 365 days, with 360 suspended.
- In 2011 the Washington Legislature amended RCW 9A.20.021(2) to reduce the maximum jail term for a gross misdemeanor from 365 days to 364 days, citing disproportionate immigration consequences (automatic deportation).
- In 2015 Grinstead moved under CrR 7.8 to reduce her sentenced term to 364 days, arguing the 2011 amendment should apply retroactively to her final judgment.
- The trial court denied her motion, concluding the 2011 amendment does not apply retroactively; Grinstead appealed and filed a consolidated personal restraint petition seeking the same relief.
- The court limited review to whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying relief under CrR 7.8 and whether the legislative amendment was retroactive or remedial/curative.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2011 amendment reducing gross misdemeanor maximum from 365 to 364 days applies retroactively to modify an already-final misdemeanor judgment | Grinstead: legislative intent ("to cure") indicates retroactive application so she should get the lower 364-day cap | State: statutes are presumed prospective; RCW 10.01.040 saves prior offenses/penalties absent clear retroactive intent; the amendment is substantive, not remedial or curative | The amendment is not retroactive; no clear legislative intent or remedial/curative character. Court affirmed denial of CrR 7.8 relief |
| Whether the amendment is remedial or curative (which would favor retroactivity) | Grinstead: the stated purpose to "cure" immigration inequity implies remedial/curative character | State: the change altered a substantive sentencing maximum and did not merely clarify or correct an ambiguity | The amendment is substantive, not remedial or curative, so it does not overcome the presumption against retroactivity |
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion under CrR 7.8 in denying relief | Grinstead: court should have granted modification under CrR 7.8 given legislative purpose and immigration consequences | State: applying usual standards, the court correctly refused to alter a final judgment absent statutory retroactivity or remedial language | No abuse of discretion: trial court applied correct legal standard and reached a tenable decision |
| Whether any procedural defects (timeliness/transfer to PRP) require different treatment | Grinstead: sought relief via both CrR 7.8 and personal restraint petition | State: trial court considered merits; appellate commissioner treated matter as appealable | Court did not need to resolve timeliness transfer issues because motion was decided on merits; appeal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (establishes validity of Alford pleas)
- State v. Dixon, 159 Wn.2d 65 (2006) (defines abuse of discretion standard for sentencing and trial-court rulings)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Flint, 174 Wn.2d 539 (2012) (sets test for when statutory amendments may apply retroactively: explicit intent, curative, or remedial)
- State v. Rose, 191 Wn. App. 858 (2015) (interprets RCW 10.01.040 saving statute and when legislative language shows retroactive intent)
- State v. Zornes, 78 Wn.2d 9 (1970) (example where legislature's language overcame saving statute to affect pending matters)
- State v. Schenck, 169 Wn. App. 633 (2012) (explains de novo review for questions of law such as retroactivity)