State Of Washington v. Latousha Ranee Young, 74537-9

Background

In August 2015 a domestic violence no‑contact order prohibited Latousha Young from contacting Alexis Stewart or coming within 1,000 feet of Stewart’s residence, school, workplace, or person.
On October 4, 2015, Stewart was staying at the home of Young’s mother, Janice Young, having lived there for about a month.
Around 1:00 a.m., Janice saw Young break a window, enter the home, and attempt to go into the bedroom where Stewart was staying; Janice tried to restrain Young and called 911.
Young assaulted Stewart; she then fled to the backyard and was arrested hiding in bushes. The State charged Young with first‑degree burglary and violating the no‑contact order; the jury convicted on both counts.
Young moved to dismiss the burglary charge for insufficiency of the evidence (arguing she had permission to enter or remain); the trial court denied the motion and instructed the jury on unlawful entry including a directive that court orders cannot be overridden by occupant consent.
Young appealed the burglary conviction and raised additional claims (jury instruction error, other alleged trial errors, and LFO challenges); the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and the mandatory LFOs and addressed appellate costs.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Young)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Sufficiency: Was entry or remaining unlawful for burglary?	Janice’s general permission to visit meant Young was licensed to enter or remain; no unlawful entry.	Evidence showed Young broke a window, Janice restrained her and called police, and a no‑contact order barred Young — so entry/remaining was unlawful.	Court affirmed: a reasonable juror could find Young lacked permission and violated the no‑contact order; evidence sufficient.
Effect of no‑contact order vs occupant consent	Occupant consent (Janice) gave Young license despite the order.	A court order cannot be nullified by occupant consent; the protective order expressly excluded Young.	Court held occupant consent cannot override a court order; order made entry unlawful.
Jury instruction: Did instruction improperly comment on evidence or misstate law?	Instruction was broader than Sanchez and resolved factual questions (e.g., residency).	Instruction accurately stated the law that consent cannot override a court order and did not resolve factual disputes left to jury.	Court held instruction was a correct legal statement and not an improper comment on evidence.
Legal Financial Obligations (LFOs): Were mandatory LFOs improper without ability‑to‑pay finding?	Imposition of mandatory fees without considering ability to pay violates statutes/due process/equal protection.	Mandatory DNA fee and victim penalty assessment are statutorily required and must be imposed without ability‑to‑pay finding.	Court affirmed mandatory LFOs; rejected Young’s constitutional challenges following precedent.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216 (superseding principle for Jackson review) (standard for sufficiency review)
State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192 (evidence viewed in light most favorable to State)
State v. Sanchez, 166 Wn. App. 304 (consent of protected person cannot override court order excluding a person from residence)
State v. Wilson, 136 Wn. App. 596 (distinguished — order there did not exclude defendant from shared residence)
State v. Woods, 143 Wn.2d 561 (prohibition on judicial comment on evidence via instructions)
State v. Brush, 183 Wn.2d 550 (instructions cannot resolve contested factual issues)
State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827 (procedural context for LFO review)
State v. Mathers, 193 Wn. App. 913 (rejecting similar constitutional challenges to mandatory LFOs)