State of Washington v. Justin Wayne Croson
34527-1
| Wash. Ct. App. | Jul 11, 2017Background
- Neighbors saw an unlicensed SUV and trailer backed to a foreclosed, unoccupied house; voices were heard and neighbors called 911 twice reporting a likely burglary.
- Justin Croson and Starla Dillard exited the house and entered the SUV; after being confronted, the SUV sped away, damaging a parked truck while leaving the gated driveway.
- Deputies stopped the SUV, detained Croson and Dillard, and found tools in the vehicle (hammers, screwdriver, bolt cutters, reciprocating saw). Croson said he was installing a stove and working on cabinets at the bank's request.
- Deputies later inspected the foreclosed house and observed the rear door removed, kitchen cabinets partly disassembled, a stove on a dolly, and other damage consistent with removal of fixtures.
- The State charged Croson with residential burglary, first degree malicious mischief, and failure to remain at the scene of an accident; the jury convicted on residential burglary only.
- On appeal Croson challenged sufficiency of the evidence; the Court affirmed and declined to award appellate costs based on indigency.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for residential burglary (unlawful entry with intent to commit a crime) | State: Evidence (tools, damaged kitchen, Croson caught in act, false statement about authorization) proved lack of permission and intent | Croson: State failed to prove lack of permission — Fuller (listing agent) may not have been sole authority; someone else might have authorized entry; acquittal on malicious mischief suggests no causation | Affirmed: Viewing evidence favorably to State, a rational jury could find Croson lacked permission and was committing disassembly; circumstantial and direct evidence sufficient |
| Whether State had to exclude all possible grantors of permission | State: No; need only prove beyond reasonable doubt that Croson lacked permission; direct rebuttal of Croson’s claim sufficed | Croson: State should have excluded possibility that another authorized entry | Held for State: Not required to produce testimony from every possible authority; weight goes to jury |
| Implication of malicious mischief acquittal on burglary culpability | State: Not dispositive; acquittal could reflect inability to prove damage threshold, not lack of involvement | Croson: Jury's not-guilty on malicious mischief undermines burglary conviction | Held for State: Jury could find Croson committed the disassembly but State may have failed to prove damage exceeded statutory threshold for first-degree mischief |
| Awarding appellate costs | State: Entitled to costs as prevailing party | Croson: Indigent; requested waiver | Court exercise discretion and majority declined to award appellate costs due to defendant's indigency |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda warnings required before custodial interrogation)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of evidence review: whether any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Pirtle v. State, 127 Wn.2d 628 (1995) (appellate standard for sufficiency review in Washington)
- Kintz v. State, 169 Wn.2d 537 (2010) (defendant’s sufficiency challenge admits truth of State’s evidence and reasonable inferences)
- Thomas v. State, 150 Wn.2d 821 (2004) (deference to jury on credibility and conflicting testimony)
- Green v. State, 94 Wn.2d 216 (1980) (appellate courts do not reweigh evidence)
- Varga v. State, 151 Wn.2d 179 (2004) (circumstantial and direct evidence carry equal weight)
- Grimes v. State, 92 Wn. App. 973 (1998) (only persons with residence or authority over premises can grant license to enter)
- Nolan v. State, 141 Wn.2d 620 (2000) (appellate costs are permissive; court may decline to award costs)