State of Washington v. Julio Gavier Ramirez, Jr.
34223-9
| Wash. Ct. App. | Jun 15, 2017Background
- Ramirez (age 18) spent the night at victim H.S.'s apartment after a party; H.S. fell asleep on the bed and later awoke to Ramirez digitally penetrating her and engaging in further unwanted sexual contact. H.S. reported the assault at an emergency room and police were notified.
- The State charged Ramirez with second-degree rape (victim physically helpless/asleep) and third-degree rape; jury convicted on second-degree rape and acquitted on third-degree rape.
- At trial, the defense attempted to cross-examine H.S. about whether she had kissed her female roommate; the court sustained the prosecution's objection and no offer of proof was made.
- At sentencing Ramirez requested an exceptional downward departure based on youth/immature capacity (citing O’Dell) and lack of exposure to modern sexual mores; the court heard argument and denied the request, imposing a low-end standard-range sentence of 78 months.
- On appeal Ramirez argued (1) the sentencing court failed to consider his mitigating evidence and categorically denied downward departure, (2) the trial court erred in barring cross-examination about alleged kissing of roommate, and (3) insufficient evidence supported that H.S. was asleep.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Ramirez) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether sentencing court abused discretion by not considering mitigating factors and categorically refusing downward departure | Court considered factors and properly exercised discretion to deny departure | Court failed to consider youth and lack of sexual-mores education and effectively issued categorical bar to downward departures | No abuse—court considered and rejected the factors; not a categorical refusal; standard-range sentence affirmed |
| Admissibility of cross-examination whether victim kissed roommate (rape-shield) | Rape-shield bars prior sexual behavior; State did not open the door to that specific evidence | Question was admissible because State opened the door by asking about reasons to hide consensual relationships | Not preserved for review: defense made no offer of proof; trial court’s exclusion not shown to be an abuse of discretion |
| Whether exclusion of the question violated Sixth Amendment confrontation right | Rape-shield rules and trial procedure were followed | Exclusion prevented constitutionally required cross-examination | Not considered on the merits—no offer of proof and issue not raised below, so cannot show manifest constitutional error |
| Sufficiency of evidence that victim was asleep (physically helpless) | Victim’s testimony that penetration occurred when she awoke supports finding she was asleep/unable to consent | Testimony was equivocal and inconsistent; creates reasonable doubt whether she was asleep | Evidence sufficient: jury could rationally find H.S. was asleep/physically helpless; conviction affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. O'Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680 (2015) (juvenile/adolescent brain development can bear on culpability and sentencing mitigation)
- State v. Garcia‑Martinez, 88 Wn. App. 322 (1997) (limits appellate review of standard‑range sentences when court considered downward departure request)
- State v. Cole, 117 Wn. App. 870 (2003) (denial of below‑range sentence not appealable where court considered factors and exercised discretion)
- State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333 (2005) (sentencing court abuses discretion if it refuses in all circumstances to consider departures)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d 322 (2007) (same principle on categorical refusal and sentencing discretion)
- State v. Tili, 139 Wn.2d 107 (1999) (digital penetration qualifies as sexual intercourse under rape statutes)
- State v. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d 1 (1983) (trial court’s discretion in admissibility issues, including sexual conduct evidence)
- State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821 (2004) (appellate courts defer to jury credibility determinations)
- State v. Mohamed, 175 Wn. App. 45 (2013) (sleep equates to physical helplessness under rape statute)
