State of Washington v. Jose Luis Aguilar
34221-2
| Wash. Ct. App. | Apr 13, 2017Background
- Aguilar was convicted in 2014 of second-degree murder and first-degree rape of a child, receiving long consecutive sentences and discretionary LFOs totaling $34,718.97; no on-record ability-to-pay finding or Blazina inquiry occurred at sentencing.
- In 2014 the judgment included $2,189.44 restitution; no appeal of the judgment is shown in the record.
- In 2016 Aguilar moved to terminate discretionary LFOs, invoking Blazina and RCW 10.01.160(3); the court ordered a new sentencing hearing to assess ability to pay.
- At the 2016 resentencing, Aguilar testified that wage garnishment reduced his income to about $40/month from prison earnings; the State noted he had paid some LFOs.
- The trial court found a minimal present ability to pay but stated it would re-address the LFO issue upon release; it amended the judgment to reflect potential future payment ability.
- The Court of Appeals remanded to strike the discretionary LFOs after concluding the evidence did not support a current or future ability to pay the total LFO amount, including interest.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court’s ability-to-pay finding was clearly erroneous | Aguilar argues there is insufficient evidence of current or future ability to pay. | Aguilar’s position is that payment is possible given any available assets and earnings. | Yes; the finding was clearly erroneous and LFOs must be struck. |
| Whether Blazina requires retroactive application for this challenge to LFOs | Blazina requires individualized inquiry into ability to pay; challenge must be reviewed. | The court followed Blazina’s framework at resentencing. | Remand proper for compliance with Blazina. |
| Whether the court could impose discretionary LFOs during incarceration given ongoing inability to pay principal and interest | LFOs should be limited or remitted because interest accrues and cannot be paid. | The court may require payment considering current and future prospects. | Imposition of discretionary LFOs was improper; remand to strike. |
| Whether the remedy is to strike discretionary LFOs rather than reduce them | Strike discretionary LFOs to maximize Aguilar’s future ability to pay. | The court may choose to modify or remit, not necessarily strike outright. | Remand to strike the discretionary LFOs. |
| Whether Wakefield and related authorities support striking LFOs rather than reducing them | Wakefield favors eliminating interest accumulation and ensuring actual payability. | Legislative and court policy may permit other remedial paths. | Supports striking discretionary LFOs due to lack of payability. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827 (Wash. 2015) (require individualized inquiry into ability to pay LFOs; discretionary LFOs improper if payability not shown)
- City of Richland v. Wakefield, 186 Wn.2d 596 (Wash. 2016) (remission/waiver of interest on LFOs and payability considerations)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Flippo, 187 Wn.2d 106 (Wash. 2016) (LFO errors do not render judgment facially invalid; ripeness considerations)
- State v. Crook, 146 Wn. App. 24 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (whether LFO issues are ripe for appeal; context of remission)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Dove, 196 Wn. App. 148 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (payability considerations for LFOs; post-conviction challenges)
- State v. Bertrand, 165 Wn. App. 393 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (standard for reviewing ability-to-pay findings (clearly erroneous))
- State v. Lundy, 176 Wn. App. 96 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (clearly erroneous standard for factual findings on payability)
