State of Washington v. Jose Antonio Manajares
197 Wash. App. 798
| Wash. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- In 2002 Jose Antonio Manajares entered an Alford plea to one count of unlawful imprisonment in Washington; the standard plea form included a general statutory immigration-warning and an interpreter read the form to him.
- He was removed from the United States shortly after the conviction; immigration officials later characterized the conviction as an aggravated felony.
- In 2012 (about ten years later) Manajares filed a CrR 7.8 motion to withdraw the plea, arguing ineffective assistance because trial counsel did not advise him that the plea would result in deportation/exclusion.
- The trial court refused to hear the motion because Manajares was absent; a commissioner affirmed denial on timeliness and adequacy-of-warning grounds; the Washington Supreme Court remanded in light of Tsai v. In re Personal Restraint of Yung‑Cheng Tsai.
- On remand the Court of Appeals considered (1) whether Padilla/Tsai allowed a timely collateral challenge, and (2) whether counsel’s performance was deficient in 2002 for failing to foresee and advise about clear immigration consequences from the plea.
- The court concluded counsel was not deficient because, in 2002, it was not "truly clear" that unlawful imprisonment under RCW 9A.40.040 categorically constituted either an aggravated felony or a crime involving moral turpitude; therefore the CrR 7.8 motion was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Manajares' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Padilla/Tsai let Manajares timely collaterally attack a 2002 plea | Padilla/Tsai permit withdrawal despite elapsed time because counsel failed to advise on deportation risk | The motion was untimely and precluded because plea form and judge’s warning were given | Tsai/Padilla make the collateral challenge timely here; court proceeds to merits (time bar overcome) |
| Whether counsel’s failure to advise about aggravated‑felony consequences was deficient | Counsel should have foreseen unlawful imprisonment would be treated as an aggravated felony by immigration authorities | Law was unclear in 2002 whether RCW 9A.40.040 fit the federal aggravated‑felony definition | Held: Not deficient — no authority showed it was truly clear in 2002 that unlawful imprisonment was an aggravated felony |
| Whether counsel’s failure to advise that the plea involved a crime of moral turpitude was deficient | Counsel should have warned that conviction would bar adjustment of status because it was a crime involving moral turpitude | "Moral turpitude" was a vague, unsettled federal concept in 2002; no controlling authority made it truly clear | Held: Not deficient — pre‑2002 law did not make moral‑turpitude status "truly clear" for unlawful imprisonment |
| Whether permitting an Alford plea was deficient because it enlarges the record of conviction | Alford plea incorporated police reports/affidavit and thus risked creating a removable offense in the record | Alford pleas are not per se deficient; risk depends on whether categorical/modified categorical analysis would clearly show removability | Held: Not per se deficient; given legal uncertainty in 2002 counsel’s allowance of an Alford plea was not objectively unreasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (constitutional duty to advise re: deportation when consequence is "truly clear")
- Tsai (In re Personal Restraint of Yung‑Cheng Tsai), 183 Wn.2d 91 (Wash. 2015) (Padilla applies in Washington and can overcome RCW 10.73.100(6) time bar; failure to research/advice versus affirmative misadvice)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard: reasonableness and prejudice)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (categorical approach for comparing state statute to federal generic offense)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (limits use of record of conviction; outlines categorical/modified categorical approaches)