State Of Washington v. Jorge Luis Lizarraga, 364 P.3d 810

Lizarraga was convicted after a six-week trial of murder in the second degree of Devin Topps and related firearm, burglary, and theft offenses.
The murder conviction rested in part on eyewitness accounts and forensic evidence linking Lizarraga to a gun used in the shooting and to associated crime scenes.
Key contested evidence included an out-of-court statement by Cervantes claiming Vaca-Valencia shot Topps, and the defense sought a Frye hearing on ACE-V fingerprint analysis and ballistics testimony.
The State’s investigation included witness interviews, text-message transcripts, recovered firearms, and fingerprint and firearms tool-mark identifications connecting Lizarraga to the scene and to the stolen gun.
The trial court denied the Frye hearing and the defense’s request to admit Cervantes’ hearsay, and the jury was instructed on reasonable doubt using WPIC 4.01, with a special verdict finding Lizarraga armed during the murder.
Lizarraga appeals on claims of violation of the right to present a defense, admissibility of forensic testimony, unanimity on the means of murder, and the validity of the jury instruction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Right to present a defense and hearsay	Lizarraga argues Cervantes’ statements should be admitted to present his defense.	State argues hearsay rules and reliability foreclose admission to prevent prejudice.	No error; denial of Cervantes hearsay admission did not violate the right to present a defense.
Frye/forensic evidence admissibility	ACE-V fingerprinting and ballistics lack general acceptance per NAS report; require Frye hearing.	ACE-V and ballistics are generally accepted; Frye not required.	No Frye hearing required; ACE-V and ballistics testimony upheld.
Unanimity for murder in the second degree	Right to unanimous verdict requires unanimity on the means.	Sufficient evidence supports all alternative means; unanimity on means not required.	Conviction upheld; no constitutionally required particularized unanimity.
Reasonable doubt instruction	WPIC 4.01 phrase ‘reasonable doubt is one for which a reason exists’ undermines presumption of innocence.	Washington Supreme Court approves WPIC 4.01 as correct.	Instruction affirmed; WPIC 4.01 valid.

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (due process limits on excluding trustworthy hearsay with cross-examination available)
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) (right to compulsory process is not absolute; defendant must initiate use)
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (cross-examination and presentation of witnesses essential to defense)
Finch v. State, 137 Wn.2d 792 (1999) (exclusion of hearsay undermines due process; compulsory process limits)
Jones, 168 Wn.2d 713 (2010) (rape shield/defense testimony; limits on evidentiary barriers to defense)
Ortega-Martinez, 124 Wn.2d 702 (1994) (unanimity not required when multiple means exist and evidence supports each)
Owens, 180 Wn.2d 90 (2014) (unanimity analyses for alternative means framework)
Berlin, 133 Wn.2d 541 (1997) (second-degree murder as an alternative means crime)
Pigott, 181 Wn. App. 247 (2014) (ACE-V fingerprint testimony generally admissible; Frye considerations addressed)
Chambers v. Mississippi (repeated), 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (foundational for due process and defense rights in trial)
Leal-Del Carmen, 697 F.3d 964 (2012) (witness deportation and preservation of exculpatory evidence; material witness framework)
Valencia, 218 Cal. App. 3d 808 (1990) (material witness deportation and due process considerations)