State of Washington v. Jonathan Howard Shurtz, 34654-4

Background

Juvenile Jonathan Shurtz (17) attempted to steal alcohol from a Safeway where he was trespassed; he fled, resisted arrest, and was charged with second-degree burglary (pled guilty), minor in possession, and resisting arrest.
Predisposition diagnostic report showed extensive recidivism: 11+ adjudications since 2014, 17 probation violations, ~190 days detention in 2015, multiple hospitalizations and mental-health diagnoses, and failure to complete local treatment programs.
Juvenile department recommended an upward "manifest injustice" disposition of 39–52 weeks at JRA to provide long-term, sequential, state-level therapeutic services not available locally.
State and defense jointly recommended the standard range (15–36 weeks); defense emphasized nonviolent nature of the offense and availability of treatment within standard time.
The court found manifest injustice based on recent criminal history/probation failures and the juvenile’s need for treatment with risk of reoffending, and imposed 39–52 weeks with credit for time served.
Shurtz appealed, arguing the departure was excessive and relied on factors already considered in the standard-range recommendation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Shurtz)	Held
Whether the court permissibly imposed a manifest injustice disposition outside the standard range	Manifest injustice justified by recent criminal history/probation failures and need for specialized treatment unavailable locally	Manifest injustice was excessive and based on factors already counted in standard-range recommendation; misdemeanors/nonviolent offenses shouldn’t justify departure	Affirmed: record supports manifest injustice finding and upward disposition
Whether the aggravating factors relied on are supported by substantial evidence	Juvenile report and testimony show rapid, escalating recidivism, multiple probation violations, and recent offenses	Argues misdemeanors and nonviolent nature undercut "recent criminal history" aggravator	Substantial evidence supports findings of recent criminal history and probation noncompliance
Whether the need for treatment can justify an out-of-range disposition	State: long-term, sequential state services (mental health, CBT/DBT, family therapy, vocational) are needed and not achievable in standard range	Shurtz: commitment based solely on lack of local facilities would be improper	Court properly considered treatment needs (not mere lack of local beds); treatment need plus reoffense risk justifies departure
Whether the 39–52 week term is clearly excessive	State: length reflects scope and sequencing of recommended treatments and prior failures; credit given for time served	Shurtz: standard range would have allowed for treatment; 39–52 weeks is excessive	Not clearly excessive or an abuse of discretion given treatment plan and recidivism risk

Key Cases Cited

State v. Duncan, 90 Wn. App. 808 (1998) (statutory framework for manifest injustice departures)
State v. Tauala, 54 Wn. App. 81 (1989) (need for rehabilitation/treatment and previous failure of noncustodial treatment can justify out-of-range sentence)
State v. Moro, 117 Wn. App. 913 (2003) (standard for reviewing manifest injustice dispositions)
State v. J.V., 132 Wn. App. 533 (2006) (court may consider need for treatment in manifest injustice analysis)
State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641 (1994) (substantial-evidence standard for factual findings)
State v. Meade, 129 Wn. App. 918 (2005) (probation violations qualify as aggravating factors)
State v. N.E., 70 Wn. App. 602 (1993) (requirement that standard-range disposition would present a serious and clear danger)
State v. Rhodes, 92 Wn.2d 755 (1979) (danger to juvenile welfare/future can factor into manifest injustice)
In re Welfare of Latson, 45 Wn. App. 716 (1986) (rapid, escalating recidivism presents clear danger to society)
State v. P., 37 Wn. App. 773 (1984) (appellate review of length of out-of-range dispositional commitments)