State Of Washington, V. John Marshall Briggs, 492 P.3d 218

In 2014 Snohomish County Superior Court entered a no-contact order (NCO) protecting F.S. that ran through August 11, 2019.
On May 18, 2019, John Briggs went to the motel where F.S. lived, approached within 2–3 feet, and argued with contractors and F.S.; staff and a contractor called 911 and Briggs left.
Police arrested Briggs nearby; while jailed he attempted to call F.S. four times, all calls declined.
The State charged Briggs with one felony violation of an NCO and two gross-misdemeanor counts of attempted violation; the jury convicted and found Briggs and F.S. were household members.
On appeal Briggs argued for the first time that the second amended information omitted essential mental-state elements (willfulness for Count 1; intent for Counts 2–3).
The Court of Appeals held the second amended information was constitutionally deficient for failing to allege willfulness (Count 1) and intent (Counts 2–3) and reversed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Count 1’s information adequately alleged the element of willfulness for felony NCO violation	The information’s allegation that defendant had “knowledge” of the order and “did violate” it fairly alleges knowing/willful violation	Briggs: omission of willfulness means the information failed to allege an essential element; knowledge of order ≠ intent to contact	The court: omission of a term conveying willfulness is fatal; knowledge of the order alone does not allege willful (intentional) contact — Count 1 deficient
Whether Counts 2–3 adequately alleged the element of intent required for attempt under RCW 9A.28.020	Alleging a “substantial step” toward violating the order implies criminal intent (substantial step strongly corroborates intent)	Briggs: the information fails to allege the required specific intent to commit the crime; a “substantial step” allegation alone is only an act, not intent	The court: both intent and a substantial step are distinct essential elements; the information fails to allege intent — Counts 2–3 deficient

State v. Zillyette, 178 Wn.2d 153 (discusses that all essential elements must appear in a charging document)
State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d 93 (liberal construction of charging documents and notice standard)
State v. Pry, 194 Wn.2d 745 (remedy for insufficient charging document is dismissal without prejudice)
State v. Moavenzadeh, 135 Wn.2d 359 (reversing where information omitted an essential mental-state element)
State v. Clowes, 104 Wn. App. 935 (willful violation requires intentional contact and knowledge of NCO)
State v. Sisemore, 114 Wn. App. 75 (inadvertent or accidental contact is insufficient for willful violation)
State v. Tunney, 129 Wn.2d 336 (holding certain offense words like “assault” may fairly imply intent)
State v. Simon, 120 Wn.2d 196 (omission of required mental state cannot be cured when it cannot be fairly implied)
State v. Nelson, 191 Wn.2d 61 (elements of attempt: specific intent plus substantial step)
State v. Johnson, 173 Wn.2d 895 (substantial step is an act that strongly corroborates criminal purpose)