State Of Washington v. John A. Chacon, 49184-2

Background

On Feb. 16–17, 2016 John Chacon, a 35‑year‑old, remained in the Olympia Center Senior Center after staff told him he did not meet the 55+ age requirement; he made threats when asked to leave and was later issued a trespass warning.
Police arrested Chacon the next day after he returned; during escort to a patrol car he resisted, officers used a knee strike on Chacon, and Chacon answered with a leg strike to Officer Davis’s right knee.
Officer Davis immediately suffered intense pain and a dislocated kneecap, required light duty and physical therapy, and was off active duty about 14 weeks.
Chacon was charged with second‑degree assault (recklessly causing substantial bodily harm to an officer) and first‑degree criminal trespass; he defended that the evidence did not prove substantial bodily harm or that he struck Davis.
At trial the court denied Chacon’s request for an inferior‑degree instruction (assault in the third degree), instructed the jury on reasonable doubt using a modified WPIC 4.01 formulation, and the prosecutor made several contentious closing remarks; Chacon did not object at trial.
The jury convicted on both counts; Chacon appealed arguing (1) failure to give the inferior‑degree instruction, (2) prosecutorial misconduct in closing, and (3) error in the reasonable‑doubt instruction.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Chacon)	Held
Whether trial court erred by refusing an inferior‑degree (3rd‑degree) assault instruction	No — evidence showed Davis suffered substantial bodily harm (dislocated kneecap) so only 2nd‑degree fits	Yes — evidence could support conviction only of 3rd‑degree because officers’ knee strike or close distance might explain injury and no one saw a kick	Denied — court properly refused instruction; defendant failed to affirmatively present evidence supporting only the lesser offense
Whether prosecutor committed reversible misconduct in closing argument	Argument attacked defense theory and urged adherence to burden of proof; within latitude	Prosecutor mischaracterized burden, disparaged defense and counsel, and shifted burden	Some remarks improper (disparaging defense) but not prejudicial; no reversible misconduct shown
Whether the reasonable‑doubt instruction was legally adequate	Instruction tracked WPIC 4.01 closely and did not prejudice the defendant	Instruction omitted WPIC sentence that defendant bears no burden to prove reasonable doubt, relieving State’s burden	Error to deviate from WPIC 4.01, but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; conviction affirmed
Whether unobjected‑to errors require reversal	State: errors were harmless; defendant failed to preserve some claims	Chacon: cumulative effect and manifest constitutional error warrant reversal	Court applied harmless‑error analysis and affirmed; no reversal required

Key Cases Cited

State v. Fernandez–Medina, 141 Wn.2d 448 (2000) (third‑prong test: defendant must affirmatively present evidence supporting only inferior offense)
State v. Peterson, 133 Wn.2d 885 (1997) (framework for inferior‑degree instruction analysis)
State v. Foster, 91 Wn.2d 466 (1979) (early discussion of inferior‑degree instruction requirements)
State v. Corey, 181 Wn. App. 272 (2014) (statutory right to lesser‑degree instruction under RCW 10.61.003)
State v. Bennett, 161 Wn.2d 303 (2007) (trial courts directed to use WPIC 4.01 reasonable‑doubt instruction)
State v. Lundy, 162 Wn. App. 865 (2011) (failure to use WPIC 4.01 is subject to harmless‑error analysis)
State v. Thorgerson, 172 Wn.2d 438 (2011) (scope of prosecutor's latitude in closing argument)
State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741 (2012) (standard for prosecutorial misconduct and prejudice, and cure by instruction)
State v. Brown, 147 Wn.2d 330 (2002) (harmless‑error standard for constitutional instructional errors)
State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91 (2009) (review of manifest constitutional error in jury instructions)