State Of Washington v. John David Swanson
74939-1
| Wash. Ct. App. | Jun 5, 2017Background
- John Swanson was charged with fourth-degree domestic violence assault (April 23) and second-degree robbery (handbag grab on April 28).
- Wife testified to both incidents; for the robbery three eyewitnesses corroborated the handbag seizure and flight, while the assault rested on the wife's uncorroborated testimony.
- Swanson moved to sever the counts before trial; the trial court denied the motion.
- Trial lasted a few days; Swanson did not testify or present evidence and advanced different defenses in closing (denying the assault occurred; claiming lack of intent to steal the handbag because items were community property).
- Jury convicted Swanson of assault and acquitted him of robbery. Swanson appealed the denial of severance.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of motion to sever counts was an abuse of discretion | State: joinder was proper; jury can follow instructions and decide counts separately | Swanson: joinder prejudiced assault defense because force shown in robbery (corroborated by eyewitnesses) improperly bolstered wife's assault testimony | Court: no abuse of discretion; jurors could compartmentalize, defenses were consistent, and instruction to decide counts separately mitigated prejudice |
| Whether stronger robbery evidence (eyewitnesses) rendered joinder unfair | State: number of witnesses does not alone show prejudice | Swanson: robbery evidence was stronger and thus contaminating | Court: strength imbalance not dispositive; disputed issue in robbery was intent and wife was unsure of motive |
| Whether lack of cross-admissibility required severance | State: not dispositive; separate inadmissibility alone insufficient | Swanson: robbery evidence was propensity evidence making assault more plausible and thus prejudicial | Court: lack of cross-admissibility not automatic ground for severance; factors favored joinder (simplicity, short trial, separate defenses) |
| Need for limiting instruction | State: jurors presumed to follow standard separate-count instruction | Swanson: requested specific limiting instruction; absence prejudicial | Court: Swanson did not request one; pattern separate-count instruction sufficed under facts |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Bythrow, 114 Wn.2d 713 (1990) (standards for reversal of joinder/severance decisions and defendant's burden to show manifest prejudice)
- State v. Sutherby, 165 Wn.2d 870 (2009) (factors for severance and significance of limiting instruction where prosecution improperly relied on joined evidence)
- State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24 (1994) (list of factors courts consider when deciding severance)
- State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17 (2008) (presumption that jurors follow instructions to consider each count separately)
