State of Washington v. Jerome Curry, Jr., 199 Wash. App. 43

Jerome Curry was charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance and originally had appointed counsel.
Defense counsel filed a motion (on Curry’s behalf) seeking permission for Curry to proceed pro se. A pretrial hearing was held to assess the waiver of counsel.
At the hearing Curry repeatedly said he had “no choice” but to represent himself because counsel sought a continuance due to personnel changes at the public defender’s office and Curry wanted a speedy resolution.
Curry said he would work with counsel if counsel could be ready earlier; he expressed frustration and a desire to finish the matter quickly (e.g., losing his home, obligations).
The trial court characterized Curry’s reason as time pressure, found his recitation accurate, accepted his waiver, and allowed him to proceed pro se. Five weeks later Curry was tried by jury, convicted, and appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding Curry’s request to proceed pro se was equivocal because it was rooted in frustration with counsel’s requested continuance.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Curry)	Held
Was Curry’s request for self-representation unequivocal and timely?	Curry repeatedly asked to represent himself and persisted after warnings; waiver therefore valid.	Curry argued he needed to proceed pro se because counsel wanted a continuance and he wanted a speedy resolution.	Denied: request was equivocal—rooted in frustration over counsel’s continuance request; presumption in favor of counsel remained.

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (recognizes constitutional right to self-representation)
State v. De Weese, 117 Wn.2d 369 (1991) (discusses interplay of waiver of counsel and self-representation)
State v. Madsen, 168 Wn.2d 496 (2010) (requires timely and unequivocal request before Faretta colloquy)
State v. Woods, 143 Wn.2d 561 (2001) (threshold inquiry: request must be timely and unequivocal)
State v. Luvene, 127 Wn.2d 690 (1995) (requests based solely on frustration with delay are equivocal)
State v. Modica, 164 Wn.2d 83 (2008) (defendant may strategically waive counsel to avoid delay, but record must show clear strategic choice)
State v. Campbell, 103 Wn.2d 1 (1984) (speedy trial rights can be harmonized with counsel’s need for time)
State v. Flinn, 154 Wn.2d 193 (2005) (trial dates may be changed over a defendant’s objection)
State v. Rohrich, 149 Wn.2d 647 (2003) (standard of review for Faretta-related rulings)
In re Det. of Turay, 139 Wn.2d 379 (1999) (presumption against waiver of counsel)