State of Washington v. Jeremiah James Gilbert, 37121-2

Background

In 1992, 15-year-old Jeremiah Gilbert murdered two people, attempted a third murder, and committed related violent felonies; he was originally sentenced to life without parole plus additional terms.
After Miller v. Alabama, Washington enacted a "Miller-fix" (RCW 10.95.035) and Gilbert was resentenced; the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Gilbert (Gilbert I) held resentencing courts must consider youth as mitigating and may impose exceptional below-range terms.
The ISRB paroled Gilbert on his aggravated-first-degree murder sentence; he remained subject to a consecutive sentence for first-degree murder.
At the May 2019 resentencing the court heard victim impact testimony, family and rehabilitation evidence, and expert psychological reports (Drs. Roesch and Wentworth). The court reduced the first-degree murder term to 240 months and ran it consecutive to the served 25-year term, producing a 45-year aggregate sentence.
The Court of Appeals concluded that a 45-year aggregate sentence for a juvenile is a de facto life sentence under recent Washington authority and vacated and remanded for resentencing; it rejected claims of judicial bias and abuse of discretion in limiting expert-fee funding to $2,500.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Gilbert's Argument	Held
Whether the 45-year aggregate sentence is a de facto life sentence prohibited under Washington law	The consecutive terms are lawful and appropriate given severity and multiple convictions	The 45-year sentence is effectively life without parole for a juvenile and therefore categorically prohibited	Vacated and remanded: 45 years deemed a de facto life sentence under controlling state precedent; resentencing required
Whether the sentencing judge demonstrated disqualifying bias requiring reassignment	Judge followed mandates, considered evidence, and showed no commitment to a predetermined outcome	Judge showed bias (tone, fee rulings) and should be reassigned for resentencing	Denied: no actual or objective basis for disqualification; reassignment not required
Whether the trial court abused discretion by limiting public funds for defense expert to $2,500	Limit was reasonable given overlapping prior work, scope of updated services, and need to control costs	$5,000 (or $2,500 supplemental) was reasonable for necessary expert work; denial was manifestly unreasonable	Denied: $2,500 funding limit was not an abuse of discretion
Whether the court abused sentencing discretion under Miller/Gilbert I (scope of mitigation findings)	Sentence was within court's discretion and reflective of aggravating factors	Sentencing failed to adequately account for Miller factors and youth; requested greater reduction/concurrency	Not decided on merits: remand driven by de facto life ruling; future resentencing must follow Gilbert I and make specific findings

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional)
State v. Gilbert, 193 Wn.2d 169 (2019) (Gilbert I) (resentencing under Miller-fix must consider youth and permit exceptional below-range sentences)
Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1 (2017) (sentencing guidance requiring individualized youth consideration)
State v. Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67 (2018) (Washington constitution bars juvenile life without parole)
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021) (U.S. Supreme Court decision on juvenile life-without-parole standards)
State v. Solis-Diaz, 187 Wn.2d 535 (2017) (appearance of fairness and reassignment standards)
State v. Punsalan, 156 Wn.2d 875 (2006) (CrR 3.1 public-funding rule applies even with privately retained counsel)