State Of Washington v. Jayson Lee Boyd, 74933-1

Background

In 1999 Jayson Boyd pleaded guilty to third-degree child rape (convicted July 29, 1999) and is subject to Washington's sex-offender registration laws.
Legislature amended RCW 9A.44.130 in 1999 to require transients (those without a fixed residence) to report weekly, in person, to the county sheriff; later amendments increased reporting and disclosure requirements and raised penalties for repeated failures to register.
Boyd, who is homeless and mentally ill, intermittently complied but missed weekly check-ins between Jan 27 and Feb 10, 2015; he was charged with failure to register and, after missing an omnibus hearing, with bail jumping.
At trial a jury convicted Boyd of failure to register and bail jumping; he was sentenced to 45 months and appealed.
The majority affirmed, rejecting Boyd’s ex post facto, insufficiency, prosecutorial misconduct, and jury-instruction challenges; Judge Becker dissented arguing the retroactive weekly in-person reporting is punitive and violates the ex post facto clause when applied to pre-1999 offenders.

Issues

Issue	Boyd's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Ex post facto: do transient weekly in‑person reporting requirements, applied retroactively, constitute punishment?	1999 amendment imposes an increased, punitive burden (akin to probation), disadvantaging pre‑1999 offenders	Requirement is regulatory (public‑safety), not punitive; Ward controls; burdens are incidental to conviction	Majority: statute is regulatory, not punitive; no ex post facto violation affirmed. Dissent: weekly in‑person reporting is punitive and would violate ex post facto.
Sufficiency — failure to register	State failed to prove required elements (e.g., conviction date)	Conviction judgment and signed orders established duty to register; to‑convict instruction included date but State proved conviction existed then	Affirmed: evidence (judgment, admissions) sufficient to sustain conviction.
Sufficiency — bail jumping (knowledge element)	Boyd lacked knowledge he had to appear on Nov 6 because court misspoke and told him Dec 6	Signed October 16 order required appearance on Nov 6; jury could infer notice from that order	Affirmed: reasonable juror could find Boyd knew date based on signed order.
Prosecutorial misconduct (closing rebuttal)	Prosecutor mocked defense, referenced poverty/mental illness and demeaned counsel ("bla, bla, bla") prejudicing fairness	Prosecutor properly rebutted defense theory and challenged lack of evidence; any impugning was minimal and not prejudicial	Majority: some comment ("bla, bla, bla") was improper as to counsel but not so prejudicial to warrant mistrial; conviction stands.
Jury instruction on reasonable doubt (WPIC 4.01, "abiding belief")	Language invites jurors to search for truth; constitutionally defective	WPIC 4.01 (including "abiding belief") is approved by Washington Supreme Court and properly states burden	Affirmed: instruction is proper and consistent with precedent.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Ward, 123 Wn.2d 488 (1994) (held sex‑offender registration is regulatory, not punitive, for ex post facto purposes)
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (considered Alaska registry and held registration not punitive; discussed Mendoza‑Martinez factors)
Kennedy v. Mendoza‑Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (sets factors for determining whether civil measures are punitive)
State v. Enquist, 163 Wn. App. 41 (2011) (applied Ward to transient weekly reporting and rejected ex post facto challenge)
State v. Lindsay, 180 Wn.2d 423 (2014) (standard for reviewing prosecutorial misconduct and prejudice)
State v. Pirtle, 127 Wn.2d 628 (1995) (approved WPIC reasonable‑doubt language)
State v. Bennett, 161 Wn.2d 303 (2007) (approved WPIC 4.01 and directed its use in criminal cases)