State Of Washington v. Jared Evans
48008-5
Wash. Ct. App.Nov 29, 2016Background
- On Feb 27, 2015, Jared Evans was at St. Anthony Prompt Care carrying a Taser (flashlight/Taser device) and a cigarette lighter; surveillance and testimony showed sparks when the Taser was activated.
- Evans was asked to move away from the entrance after clicking the Taser; he later entered a restroom. Four-and-a-half minutes later, Kevin Donoghue saw burning paper towels in the bathroom garbage can and observed Evans removing burning towels and placing them on the floor.
- Donoghue alerted staff and extinguished the fire; Evans ran from the restroom and left the building without warning anyone. Police recovered the Taser and lighter from Evans’s bag with his consent; the items were not admitted into evidence.
- The State charged Evans with first-degree arson (must have knowingly and maliciously caused fire in occupied building). Evans’s defense was that he discovered the fire and attempted to put it out.
- At trial the prosecutor argued a Taser could start a fire and suggested that starting a fire implies knowledge and malice; Evans did not object at trial. The jury convicted Evans; the Court of Appeals affirmed and waived appellate costs.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prosecutorial misconduct — arguing facts not in evidence (Taser can start fire) | Prosecutor: Taser produced sparks and electrical charge; reasonable inference it can ignite paper | Evans: No testimony or demonstration that the Taser could start a fire; arguing facts not in evidence | Court: Not misconduct — argument was a reasonable inference from testimony about sparks; no incurable prejudice and jury instructed that statements are not evidence |
| Prosecutorial misconduct — misstating mens rea (reducing knowing/malicious element) | State: If defendant started the fire, that act is itself knowing and malicious; focus was on whether Evans started the fire | Evans: Prosecutor effectively eliminated the State’s burden to prove knowing and malicious conduct | Court: Comment permissible inference; jury received proper definitions and a to-convict instruction requiring knowing and malicious conduct; no reversible misconduct |
| Sufficiency of evidence — malice element | State: Circumstantial evidence (behavior, tools, videotape, removing burning towels, flight) supports inference of malice | Evans: State failed to prove malicious intent beyond a reasonable doubt | Court: Evidence, viewed in State’s favor, permitted a rational jury to infer malice; conviction supported |
| Jury instruction on reasonable doubt | State: Instruction correctly defined reasonable doubt and required abiding belief in truth of charge | Evans: Instruction improperly focused jury on a search for truth and was constitutionally deficient | Court: Rejected challenge (followed precedent rejecting same argument) |
| SAG — double jeopardy from pretrial denial to re-interview witness | State: Pretrial denial is not punitive and jeopardy had not attached (jury empaneled later) | Evans: Denial amounted to multiple punishments for same offense | Court: No double jeopardy — jeopardy attaches when jury empaneled; pretrial ruling not punishment |
Key Cases Cited
- Emery v. State, 174 Wn.2d 741 (2012) (standard for prosecutorial misconduct review)
- Thorgerson v. State, 172 Wn.2d 438 (2011) (heightened prejudice standard when no objection)
- Dhaliwal v. State, 150 Wn.2d 559 (2003) (prosecutor may not argue facts not in evidence)
- Reed v. State, 168 Wn. App. 553 (2012) (wide latitude to draw reasonable inferences in closing)
- Montgomery v. State, 163 Wn.2d 577 (2008) (presumption jury follows court's instructions)
- Clark v. State, 78 Wn. App. 471 (1995) (malice may be inferred from circumstantial evidence of intentionally caused fire)
- Jenson v. State, 194 Wn. App. 900 (2016) (upheld reasonable-doubt instruction language challenged here)
- George v. State, 160 Wn.2d 727 (2007) (jeopardy attaches when jury is empaneled)
- Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975) (definition of when jeopardy attaches)
- Nolan v. State, 141 Wn.2d 620 (2000) (discretion in awarding appellate costs)
- Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801 (1992) (doctrine on not addressing inadequately briefed arguments)