State Of Washington v. Jai'mar Scott
196 Wash. App. 961
Wash. Ct. App.2016Background
- In 1990, Jai'Mar Scott (age 17) was convicted of murdering a vulnerable 78‑year‑old neighbor; the trial court imposed an exceptional aggregate sentence of 900 months (de facto life).
- Scott’s direct appeals to the Court of Appeals and Washington Supreme Court upheld the sentence.
- In 2016 Scott filed a CrR 7.8 motion for relief from judgment invoking Miller v. Alabama and related juvenile‑sentencing developments; the trial court granted relief and ordered resentencing.
- The State appealed, arguing Scott’s motion was untimely or, if Miller applied, Washington’s statutory “Miller fix” (RCW 9.94A.730) cured any Miller violation.
- Washington’s Miller fix makes juvenile homicide offenders presumptively eligible to petition the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB) for early release after serving at least 20 years.
Issues
| Issue | Scott's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Miller is a material, retroactive change in law that overcomes the one‑year collateral‑attack bar | Miller requires resentencing (trial court must account for youth and make individualized findings); this permits untimely collateral attack | Miller is not material because Scott’s sentence was discretionary (not mandatory), or any Miller violation is cured by RCW 9.94A.730 | Miller is material in principle, but here the statutory Miller fix cures any Miller violation so collateral relief was not warranted |
| Whether Miller applies to de facto life (aggregate term‑of‑years) sentences | Miller applies to any functional life sentence; sentencer must consider youth | Miller addressed mandatory life, but Montgomery extends the concern to discretionary/functional life sentences | Miller applies to de facto life sentences; Scott’s sentence implicated Miller principles |
| Whether Washington’s Miller fix (RCW 9.94A.730) cures a Miller/Montgomery violation and avoids resentencing | Sentencing court must make an individualized determination at sentencing; statutory parole eligibility is insufficient — resentencing required | Statutory parole eligibility (presumptive eligibility after 20 years) supplies the meaningful opportunity for release approved in Montgomery and cures the violation | Montgomery permits a statutory parole remedy; RCW 9.94A.730 is substantially similar to an approved fix and cures the Miller violation |
| Procedural consequence for Scott’s untimely CrR 7.8 motion | Relief is available because Miller is a significant, retroactive change material to his sentence | Motion was untimely and should not have resulted in resentencing because the Miller fix eliminated the underlying constitutional defect | Trial court erred in granting relief; the order for resentencing is reversed |
Key Cases Cited
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juvenile death penalty unconstitutional; juveniles are categorically different from adults)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (juveniles must have some meaningful opportunity for release; life without parole for nonhomicide juveniles unconstitutional)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional; sentencer must consider youth and potential for rehabilitation)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller announced a substantive rule that applies retroactively; States may cure Miller violations by authorizing parole consideration)
- State v. O'Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680 (2015) (Washington Supreme Court: youth is a mitigating factor; sentencer must be allowed to consider age)
- State v. Ronquillo, 190 Wn. App. 765 (2015) (Court of Appeals: Miller applies to de facto life sentences; trial court must consider youth)