State Of Washington v. Jacob Taylor Harrison
73461-0
| Wash. Ct. App. | Aug 15, 2016Background
- Two assailants robbed Morcom and Losey at gunpoint in a motel room; victims identified one assailant as “J.T.” and described the other, matching Harrison’s appearance.
- Police tracked Morcom’s phone to a nearby residence where Harrison arrived carrying items later identified as stolen; camouflage shorts, a pink lanyard, Morcom’s phone, a .38, and heroin were found at the residence.
- DNA from the motel room matched J.T. and an unknown female; no DNA matched Harrison, and police did not test items recovered from the residence.
- Losey made a 911 call identifying J.T.; he became unable or unwilling to testify at trial and the defense had previously stipulated to admission of the 911 recording.
- Harrison was convicted of first-degree robbery, unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and unlawful possession of a firearm; he appealed on confrontation-clause and prosecutorial-misconduct grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of Losey’s 911 call (Confrontation Clause) | State: recording admissible as excited utterance and defendant waived objection by stipulation | Harrison: statements were testimonial; admission violated Crawford because Losey couldn’t be cross-examined | Court: Stipulation waived confrontation claim; court would have admitted under hearsay exception; trial court did not abuse discretion |
| Motion to withdraw stipulation after Losey became unavailable | State: stipulation was unconditional; no good cause to revisit ruling | Harrison: unforeseen accident and unavailability justified withdrawing stipulation | Court: denied; parties must rely on pretrial rulings; no abuse of discretion |
| Prosecutor’s closing argument referring to judge (“the judge is telling you”) about DNA and circumstantial evidence | Harrison: prosecutor improperly implied judicial bias and misled jury about need for DNA | State: argument explained instructions that circumstantial evidence suffices; no prejudicial error | Court: remark was improper but curable; in context it reiterated jury instructions; not incurably prejudicial, no reversal |
| Failure to object at trial — ineffective assistance claim based on counsel’s lack of objection | Harrison: counsel should have objected to prosecutorial remarks | State: standard for prosecutorial misconduct controls; no separate ineffective assistance analysis required | Court: rejected separate ineffective assistance claim; prosecutorial-misconduct review adequate; no reversal |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause framework for testimonial statements)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (primary-purpose test for distinguishing testimonial from nontestimonial emergency statements)
- Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (forfeiture and confrontation implications for forensic reports)
- State v. Emerv, 174 Wn.2d 741 (2012) (standards for prosecutorial misconduct and curability by instruction)
- State v. Dhaliwal, 150 Wn.2d 559 (2003) (review of improper argument in context of entire closing)