State of Washington v. J.A.V., 501 P.3d 159

Background

Late at night J.A.V. and friend J.B. drove a Hummer to a rural agricultural tunnel; J.B. had a Molotov-style incendiary bottle and a can of blue spray paint was in the passenger area.
Officer Alviar saw a youth run from the tunnel to the Hummer; the Hummer fled and was later found with the Molotov and spray paint; fresh blue paint was observed inside the tunnel.
At bench trial the juvenile court found J.A.V. guilty of third-degree malicious mischief (spray-painting the tunnel) and taking a motor vehicle without permission; acquitted him of possessing an incendiary device and attempting to elude.
The State introduced no proof of tunnel ownership or that J.A.V. lacked permission to paint it.
At disposition the court imposed an upward "manifest injustice" disposition (20 weeks) based on two aggravators: recent criminal history/noncompliance and that J.A.V. led a criminal enterprise; the court relied in part on subsequent alleged misconduct that occurred after the trial.
On appeal J.A.V. argued (1) insufficient evidence for malicious mischief (owner/permission elements) and (2) due process violation because he lacked pretrial notice of aggravating facts used to impose an upward manifest injustice disposition.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency: ownership element of malicious mischief	State: Circumstantial evidence supports that the tunnel was "property of another" (J.A.V. did not own it).	J.A.V.: No evidence who owned the tunnel, so an element was unproven.	Court: Affirmed—reasonable trier of fact could find someone other than J.A.V. owned the tunnel under RCW property-of-another definition.
Sufficiency: permission element of malicious mischief	State: Even if burden on State, facts support that J.A.V. lacked the owner/operator's express permission.	J.A.V.: State failed to prove he lacked permission.	Court: Affirmed—State satisfied lack-of-permission by inference from circumstances.
Pretrial notice of aggravating factors for manifest injustice	State: Concedes lack of notice but argues no right to pretrial notice here.	J.A.V.: Due process requires notice of facts/aggravators before plea or trial so juvenile can defend/decide.	Court: Reversed disposition—applies D.L./M.S. holdings to require preplea/pretrial notice for juveniles (extends to not-guilty pleas); lack of notice violated due process.
Use of post-offense events / leadership finding at disposition	State: Relied on probation report and subsequent conduct to justify upward departure.	J.A.V.: Court relied on events after the offense and unsupported leadership finding.	Court: Avoided deciding sufficiency of leadership finding or reliance on post-offense events; reversal rested on notice defect and remanded for new disposition.

Key Cases Cited

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (establishes government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
State v. Homan, 181 Wn.2d 102 (standard of review for sufficiency of evidence and bench-trial findings)
State v. Wooten, 178 Wn.2d 890 (definition/interpretation of "property of another" in RCW 9A.48)
State v. M.S., 197 Wn.2d 453 (holds juveniles must receive notice of facts/aggravators before pleading guilty to support manifest injustice disposition)
State v. D.L., 197 Wn.2d 509 (same: preplea notice requirement for facts supporting upward juvenile disposition)
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (due process/fundamentally fair procedures for juvenile proceedings)
State v. Siers, 174 Wn.2d 269 (pretrial notice of adult sentencing aggravators protected by due process)
State v. Recuenco, 163 Wn.2d 428 (discusses timing of asserting sentencing enhancements/aggravators)