State of Washington v. Gerrit Jon Kobes
34232-8
| Wash. Ct. App. | Jul 13, 2017Background
- Gerrit Kobes, on a four-day jail furlough, went to 1365 Kettle Park Road (his wife's home) to retrieve personal items; a no-contact order prohibited him from coming within 100 yards of her "residence."
- At the time, Erica Kobes was in a Spokane treatment facility for a week; her mother was staying in the house with the children and the family possessions remained there.
- Kobes entered the house and retrieved his wallet and boots; Erica's mother later reported the incident to police.
- Prosecutor charged Kobes with residential burglary (felony) and violation of a no-contact order (gross misdemeanor); a jury convicted on both counts.
- Kobes appealed, arguing the term "residence" in the no-contact order was vague as applied because Erica was temporarily away, and thus the evidence was insufficient to prove unlawful entry.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "residence" in the no-contact order was unconstitutionally vague as applied | State: term is clear; protects the home listed in the order | Kobes: wife was temporarily in treatment, so Kettle Falls house was not her residence | Court: "residence" not vague; ordinary person would understand it; temporary absence does not change residence |
| Whether evidence supported "unlawful entry" element of residential burglary | State: order barred entry; entry despite order was unlawful | Kobes: mother’s permission and wife’s absence made entry lawful | Court: permission from protected person or third party cannot override court order; evidence sufficient to prove unlawful entry |
| Whether defendant could rely on Jenkins/Pickett definition to show non-residence | Kobes: relied on definitions allowing temporary dwelling to be a residence in varying contexts | State: definition includes intent to return, which supports treating house as residence | Court: adopted Jenkins/Pickett definition but found facts show intent to return, so residence upheld |
| Standard for reviewing sufficiency and vagueness | State: jury verdict should be upheld under review standards | Kobes: evidence insufficient and order vague | Court: applied Jackson standard and as-applied vagueness test; deferred to jury and affirmed convictions |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739 (use of statutory construction for court orders)
- State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109 (vagueness test: ordinary person standard)
- State v. Jenkins, 100 Wn. App. 85 (definition of "residence" in registration context)
- State v. Pickett, 95 Wn. App. 475 (adopted definition of "residence")
- State v. Sanchez, 166 Wn. App. 304 (entry is unlawful when in violation of court order despite permission)
- State v. Peterson, 174 Wn. App. 828 (as-applied vagueness framework)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency of the evidence)
