State of Washington v. Gary Bruce Farnworth
199 Wash. App. 185
| Wash. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Farnworth received 46 Washington Department of Labor & Industries (DLI) time-loss warrants between 2010–2012 while working at a used-car lot; he had signed periodic worker verification forms certifying no work.
- DLI investigated after a tip, recorded Farnworth working at the lot, and obtained his admission that he worked there while certifying unemployment; DLI continued payments until Feb 2013 (reduced rate thereafter).
- State charged three counts of first-degree theft by deception, aggregating multiple benefit payments into each count based on alleged common schemes spanning discrete date ranges (separated by two surgery/recovery gaps).
- At trial the court admitted DLI payment orders and Department of Licensing vehicle records through custodians who did not prepare them; defense objected on hearsay and confrontation-clause grounds.
- Defense sought (1) continuance for expert rebuttal, (2) to introduce evidence that DLI would have paid lower benefits even if Farnworth had reported working, and (3) to impeach a DLI investigator with alleged past misconduct; requests were denied.
- Jury acquitted on count I but convicted on counts II and III; court sentenced Farnworth on two concurrent terms and ordered restitution; appellate court vacated one conviction and affirmed the other.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Farnworth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial continuance for late expert disclosure | No prejudice; witness was disclosed months earlier or was a fact witness, not expert | Late disclosure prevented preparation and rebuttal expert; continuance required | Denied; no abuse of discretion—defendant’s continuance claims were inconsistent with record and untimely raised |
| Brady / disclosure of witness misconduct | State did not possess or know of investigator McCord’s alleged past misconduct; no suppression | Failure to disclose McCord’s alleged Ponzi-scheme involvement deprived defense of impeachment (Brady) | No Brady violation shown—defendant failed to show materiality or that the evidence would have been admissible/prejudicial |
| Confrontation clause / admission of DLI and licensing records | Records are non-testimonial business records or contain defendant’s own statements; Crawford/Davis inapplicable | Admission of records prepared by non-testifying officials violated Sixth Amendment confrontation rights | No Sixth Amendment violation—records were routine business records or contained defendant’s statements; not testimonial for prosecution purposes |
| Aggregation of multiple payments into multiple first-degree counts and jury instruction | Prosecutor may aggregate series into counts here (charged common schemes across three periods); instruction on aggregation (value) was given | Aggregation into more than one first-degree count improper under statutory/common-law rules; "common scheme or plan" must be pleaded and be an element in to-convict instructions; instructional omission prejudicial | Aggregation argument wins in part: conviction vacated as State relied on a common-scheme theory but tried to aggregate into multiple first-degree counts; court holds aggregation under statute/common-law limited—vacates one conviction; failure to include "common scheme or plan" in to-convict instructions was error but harmless here |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor's suppression of materially favorable evidence violates due process)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimonial hearsay and confrontation-clause framework)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (distinguishes testimonial statements by primary purpose test)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (Brady materiality / prejudice standard)
- State v. George, 161 Wn.2d 203 (2007) (value for theft is the total amount obtained, not net gain)
- State v. Barton, 28 Wn. App. 690 (1981) (common‑law aggregation of multiple thefts into higher‑value charge)
- State v. Hoyt, 79 Wn. App. 494 (1995) (statutory misdemeanor-aggregation treated as "may be aggregated in one count")
- State v. Jasper, 174 Wn.2d 96 (2012) (records prepared after investigation may be testimonial)
- State v. Hassan, 184 Wn. App. 140 (2014) (when State aggregates to reach value threshold, common-scheme is essential and must be alleged)
- State v. Rivas, 168 Wn. App. 882 (2012) (aggregation statutes require pleading and instruction on common scheme when used to reach statutory threshold)
