State Of Washington v. Elliott Rudolph, 49126-5

Background

Victim (AS), then 16, attended a party with defendant Elliott J. Rudolph, then 19; she became highly intoxicated and later awoke to Rudolph penetrating her while she was too intoxicated to consent or physically resist.
Forensic testing found sperm and Rudolph’s DNA on the interior crotch of AS’s underwear; a low-level, unidentified male DNA component was also detected.
AS reported pelvic pain and was diagnosed with a UTI days after the incident; the urgent care doctor testified a UTI can commonly follow first penile-vaginal intercourse but has other causes.
Rudolph argued consent, DNA transfer, and alternative explanations (prior sexual activity, an unknown male contributor); he did not testify. Defense raised chain-of-custody and DNA-transfer theories and sought a continuance for retesting.
Jury convicted Rudolph of second-degree rape. At sentencing the court imposed 88 months, discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs), and community custody conditions including domestic violence and sexual deviancy evaluations.
On appeal Rudolph challenged sufficiency of evidence, the WPIC reasonable-doubt instruction, alleged prosecutorial misconduct in closing, the domestic-violence evaluation condition, and imposition of discretionary LFOs without an individualized ability-to-pay inquiry.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Rudolph)	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for 2d-degree rape	AS’s testimony, corroborated by DNA and UTI evidence, was sufficient to prove intercourse and physical helplessness beyond a reasonable doubt	AS’s memory gaps, lack of injuries, and alternate explanations (prior sexual activity, DNA transfer) undermine sufficiency	Affirmed: viewing evidence in State’s favor, a rational juror could find intercourse and physical helplessness beyond a reasonable doubt (Salinas standard)
WPIC 4.01 “reasonable doubt” language	Instruction follows WPIC and Supreme Court precedent; proper	Language improperly shifts burden by requiring a reason for reasonable doubt	Rejected: WPIC 4.01 is proper per Bennett/Kalebaugh and subsequent authority
Prosecutorial misconduct in closing (implication victim was a virgin)	Prosecutor merely argued inferences from Dr. Wilmington’s testimony about UTIs after first intercourse; argument tracked testimony	Prosecutor argued facts not in evidence and implied AS was a virgin, warranting a new trial	No reversible misconduct: even assuming implication improper, defense rebutted during closing and error was not so flagrant that an instruction would not cure prejudice (Glasmann standard)
Imposition of domestic-violence evaluation as community custody condition	Sentencing court may order crime-related treatment reasonably related to offense and risk; presentencing report noted prior domestic-violence history	No facts showed a dating/household relationship between AS and Rudolph; offense not domestic violence	Reversed as to this condition: abuse of discretion because record lacked facts showing the offense involved domestic violence (RCW definitions)
Discretionary LFOs imposed without inquiry into ability to pay	Presentencing report provided sufficient factual basis to impose discretionary LFOs	Trial court failed to conduct on-the-record individualized inquiry as required by Blazina	Remanded: strike/ reconsider discretionary LFOs after individualized ability-to-pay inquiry per Blazina

Key Cases Cited

State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192 (1992) (standard for sufficiency review)
State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60 (1990) (credibility determinations for factfinder)
State v. Chapin, 118 Wn.2d 681 (1992) (limits on conviction when key statements excluded)
State v. Bennett, 161 Wn.2d 303 (2007) (approving WPIC 4.01 reasonable-doubt instruction)
State v. Kalebaugh, 183 Wn.2d 578 (2015) (WPIC 4.01 instruction proper)
State v. Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d 696 (2012) (flagrant, ill-intentioned misconduct standard)
State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827 (2015) (requirement of individualized on-the-record inquiry into ability to pay LFOs)
State v. Thorgerson, 172 Wn.2d 438 (2011) (prosecutor’s latitude to argue reasonable inferences)