State Of Washington v. David Smalley, 54348-6

Background

On March 5, 2019, David Smalley stabbed an acquaintance, Chambers, causing a full‑thickness abdominal wound that required exploratory surgery.
Chambers gave multiple, inconsistent statements to police (initially blaming someone named Tony), then after surgery identified Smalley as the assailant; the court found Chambers credible.
Police executed a search of Smalley’s residence, arrested him, and found methamphetamine on his person.
While in jail Smalley made recorded calls to McKenna Melton attempting to get Chambers to sign a statement that the stabbing was accidental; recordings were admitted at trial.
The State charged Smalley by amended information with first‑degree assault, witness tampering, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance; after a bench trial the court convicted him of second‑degree assault (inferior degree), possession (methamphetamine), and witness tampering.
At sentencing the court declared Smalley indigent, imposed a $500 crime victim penalty assessment, waived other fees, but the written judgment included a boilerplate community custody provision requiring payment of DOC supervision fees; the court remanded to decide whether supervision fees were intended.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Smalley's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for witness tampering (RCW 9A.72.120(1)(a))	Recorded calls and Smalley’s admissions show he tried to induce Chambers to sign a statement that the stabbing was accidental—i.e., to testify falsely.	Only tried to have Chambers confirm an accidental stabbing; no proof Smalley knew Chambers would testify falsely (defense contact with witnesses is allowed).	Affirmed: evidence was sufficient; court may infer Smalley knew the stabbing was intentional (unchallenged findings + call content).
Sufficiency of information—possession charge (mens rea)	Information tracked statute; RCW 69.50.4013 does not require knowledge.	Information was deficient for failing to allege knowledge of possession.	Affirmed: Bradshaw controls—statute lacks a mens rea element; information sufficient.
Sufficiency of information—assault charge ("unlawful force")	Information adequately alleged first‑degree assault elements; common‑law definitions are not required in the information.	Information omitted an "unlawful force" element and thus was insufficient.	Affirmed: "unlawful force" as a definitional phrase is not an essential element that must be pled.
Imposition of community custody supervision fees	Supervision fees are a discretionary LFO and may be imposed despite indigency; written judgment included the DOC fee condition.	Trial court found Smalley indigent and orally said only the $500 victim assessment; apparent intent was to waive other LFOs.	Remanded: record ambiguous whether court intended to impose DOC supervision fees; trial court to exercise discretion and clarify.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d 243 (2017) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence review)
State v. Rempel, 114 Wn.2d 77 (1990) (witness tampering—consider literal and inferential meaning of words and context)
State v. Homan, 181 Wn.2d 102 (2014) (unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal)
State v. Pry, 194 Wn.2d 745 (2019) (information must state every essential element)
State v. Johnson, 180 Wn.2d 295 (2014) (definitions of elements need not be pleaded)
State v. Bradshaw, 152 Wn.2d 528 (2004) (RCW 69.50.4013 possession statute lacks a mens rea requirement)
State v. Elmi, 166 Wn.2d 209 (2009) (common‑law definitions of assault)
State v. Smith, 159 Wn.2d 778 (2007) (common‑law definitions do not become separate essential elements for pleading)
State v. Spaulding, 15 Wn. App. 2d 526 (2020) (community custody supervision fees are discretionary LFOs)