State Of Washington, V Daniel Lee Rouse
47589-8
| Wash. Ct. App. | May 16, 2017Background
- In Sept 2014 the State filed a felony complaint in district court charging Rouse with felony violation of a protection (no‑contact) order; the district court made a probable cause finding.
- An information was filed in superior court on Oct 16, 2014; Rouse was arraigned in superior court on Oct 20 and tried starting Dec 16. Rouse was detained pretrial.
- At trial Rouse stipulated to two prior municipal convictions for violation of no‑contact orders; a jury convicted him of felony violation of a protection order.
- At sentencing the State calculated an offender score of 8 by counting each prior municipal no‑contact violation as 2 points; the court accepted that calculation and imposed the 60‑month maximum.
- Rouse appealed, arguing the offender‑score calculation was incorrect (each prior should be 1 point), and raised additional due process claims (jurisdiction, timely arraignment, time‑for‑trial and constitutional speedy‑trial violations).
- The State conceded the offender‑score error; the court found the score was miscalculated, vacated the sentence, affirmed the conviction, and remanded for resentencing. Other due process claims were rejected.
Issues
| Issue | Rouse's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether sentencing court miscalculated offender score | Prior municipal domestic‑violence no‑contact convictions are repetitive domestic violence and count 1 point each; court miscounted as 2 each | Court accepted 2 points each; State concedes error on appeal | Court: miscalculation occurred; sentence unauthorized; vacate and remand for resentencing |
| Whether superior court lacked jurisdiction because district court did not bind over after preliminary hearing | Superior court never obtained jurisdiction | District and superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction; probable cause finding in district court was sufficient | Court: no jurisdictional defect; superior court had jurisdiction |
| Whether arraignment was untimely under CrR 4.1(a)(1) | Arraignment not within 14 days of information | Information filed Oct 16; arraignment Oct 20—timely | Court: arraignment timely (4 days after filing) |
| Whether CrR 3.3 time‑for‑trial / speedy‑trial rights were violated | Rouse detained and spent time in custody before superior filing; objected to trial date; argues should have been tried sooner | State argued waiver; court finds objection timely and no CrR 3.3 violation because trial began within 60 days of superior arraignment | Court: no CrR 3.3 violation and no constitutional speedy‑trial violation; rules and higher constitutional threshold satisfied |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Pers. Restraint of Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d 861 (2002) (sentence based on miscalculated offender score is unauthorized)
- State v. Moeurn, 170 Wn.2d 169 (2010) (offender‑score calculations reviewed de novo)
- State v. Ross, 152 Wn.2d 220 (2004) (remedy for miscalculated offender score is resentencing)
- State v. Conwell, 141 Wn.2d 901 (2000) (rule application is question of law reviewed de novo)
- State v. Ollivier, 178 Wn.2d 813 (2013) (CrR 3.3 provides nonconstitutional timely‑trial right)
- State v. Iniguez, 167 Wn.2d 273 (2009) (framework for reviewing constitutional speedy‑trial claims)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (constitutional speedy‑trial analysis framework)
- State v. Carson, 128 Wn.2d 805 (1996) (trial within 60 days is not a constitutional mandate)
