State Of Washington v. D'angelo A. Saloy
72467-3
| Wash. Ct. App. | Feb 27, 2017Background
- In 2008, 16‑year‑old D'Angelo Saloy participated in a drive‑by shooting at Garfield High School that killed Quincy Coleman and wounded Demario Clark; no eyewitnesses would identify shooters.
- Investigators developed informants (Downs, Sanchez) and obtained an intercept order to record conversations between Saloy, Fola, and Sanchez; recorded statements included a detailed confession by Saloy.
- Saloy was charged in 2012 as an adult with first‑degree murder and attempted first‑degree murder, convicted by a jury, and sentenced in 2014 to 712 months (standard range plus enhancements) — a de facto life term.
- On appeal Saloy raised multiple challenges: sufficiency of the intercept affidavit and Franks hearing, prosecutorial misconduct (impugning defense counsel and commenting on silence), admission of gang‑related evidence (including a MySpace video and a statement that he urinated near the murder site), preaccusatorial delay/juvenile transfer concerns, mandatory LFOs, and that his sentence required a Miller hearing.
- The court affirmed convictions on evidentiary, misconduct, delay, and LFO claims but held the 712‑month sentence is a de facto life term for a juvenile and vacated the sentence, remanding for a Miller hearing and resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Saloy's Argument (Plaintiff) | State's Argument (Defendant) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of intercept order (RCW 9.73) | Affidavit was boilerplate and failed to particularize why other investigative means were inadequate | Affidavit described multi‑year investigation, uncooperative witnesses, lack of physical evidence, and was minimally adequate | Affidavit was sufficient; intercept order upheld |
| Franks hearing (alleged false statements/omissions in affidavit) | Affidavit misstated/omitted material facts (calibers, vehicle ownership, Sanchez's history) requiring an evidentiary hearing | Misstatements/omissions were minor or corroborated by other evidence and not material to probable cause | No Franks hearing required; no material falsity or reckless omission shown |
| Prosecutorial misconduct — comments impugning defense counsel | Prosecutor's questioning suggested defense counsel acted unethically by visiting only uncooperative witnesses | Questions had legitimate evidentiary purposes and defense counsel could clarify on cross | No prejudice shown; denial of mistrial not an abuse |
| Prosecutorial misconduct — comment on defendant's silence (Fifth Amendment) | Prosecutor said only the defendant could conclusively say certain facts, commenting on silence | Statement was incidental to argument about number of shooters and not argued as proof of guilt | Statement was constitutional error but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given overwhelming untainted evidence (the confession) |
| Admissibility of gang evidence and urine statement | Gang images, tattoos, MySpace video and statement that Saloy urinated near scene were unfairly prejudicial | Evidence was probative of gang aggravator, motive, intent, and corroborated knowledge of crime scene; limiting instruction given | Trial court did not abuse discretion admitting gang evidence or the urine statement under ER 401/403 |
| Preaccusatorial delay / juvenile transfer (RCW 13.04.030) | Delay until age 20 prejudiced Saloy by depriving juvenile adjudication; automatic decline statute is unconstitutional post‑Miller | RCW 13.04.030 automatically transferred serious juvenile offenders to adult court; Boot and subsequent authority uphold statute | No prejudice shown because automatic transfer statute applies to 16/17 year olds who commit first‑degree murder; statute not held unconstitutional here |
| Miller entitlement / de facto life sentence | 712 months is a de facto life term for a 16‑year‑old; Miller requires individualized consideration before imposing such a sentence | State conceded Miller applies where sentence is de facto life but contended procedures followed | Sentence vacated; remand for Miller hearing and resentencing with full consideration of juvenile‑specific mitigating factors |
| Mandatory legal financial obligations (LFOs) | Court imposed mandatory LFOs without an ability‑to‑pay inquiry, violating Blazina/due process | Only mandatory LFOs (DNA fee, Victim Penalty Assessment) were imposed; discretionary LFOs waived for indigency | Trial court permissibly imposed mandatory LFOs and waived discretionary ones; no error |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life‑without‑parole for juveniles unconstitutional; sentencing must account for youth differences)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty unconstitutional for juveniles)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (life without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders unconstitutional)
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (hearing required if warrant affidavit contains knowingly false statements or reckless omissions that are material)
- State v. DeLeon, 185 Wn.2d 478 (2016) (caution on admitting generalized gang evidence; limit prejudicial evidence)
- State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827 (2015) (discretionary LFOs require individualized ability‑to‑pay inquiry)
- State v. Kipp, 179 Wn.2d 718 (2014) (Washington Privacy Act is highly protective of private conversations)