State of Washington v. Craig Steven Coleman, 33415-5

On Sept. 2, 2014, Craig Coleman cashed a $3,470.18 check at Baker Boyer Bank drawn on Columbia River Plumbing; teller later doubted its authenticity.
Columbia River Plumbing owner Desiree Lindstrom testified Coleman was not an employee or subcontractor, she never authorized such a payroll check, and the check number matched one payable to Hooper's Plumbing for a lesser amount.
Hooper's Plumbing never received the referenced check; Columbia River Plumbing's account was ultimately credited after the bank's investigation.
Coleman was charged with first-degree identity theft (RCW 9.35.020) and second-degree theft (RCW 9A.56.040) based on alleged alteration/unauthorized use of the company check to obtain over $1,500.
A jury convicted Coleman on both counts; he appealed arguing insufficient evidence of the requisite criminal intent and raised several additional claims in a Statement of Additional Grounds (SAG).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence to prove intent for identity theft and theft	State: Circumstantial and direct evidence support inference Coleman altered and used the check to obtain money	Coleman: Evidence insufficient to prove he acted with intent to defraud	Affirmed — viewing evidence in State's favor, a rational juror could infer intent beyond a reasonable doubt
Request for court-ordered pretrial interviews / Brady violation	State: No suppression; Brady requires withheld material evidence, which Coleman did not allege	Coleman: Asked court to order victim/witness interviews and invoked Brady	Denied — Coleman did not allege withheld material evidence; Brady inapplicable
Sixth Amendment confrontation clause re: Hooper's Plumbing	State: Bank, not Hooper's, was victim; statements about Hooper's nonreceipt were non-testimonial	Coleman: Failure to call Hooper's Plumbing deprived confrontation and created doubt about victim's existence	Rejected — no Crawford problem; bank was victim and asserted statements were not testimonial hearsay
Article I, §9 (state constitutional) claim re: failure to call Hooper's witness	State: Section 9 protects against self-incrimination/double jeopardy, not the absence of a noncompelled witness	Coleman: Noncalling of Hooper's witness violated his state-constitutional rights	Rejected — no compulsion to testify and no double jeopardy implicated

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (establishes standard for sufficiency of evidence review)
State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192 (sufficiency review and drawing inferences for the State)
State v. Goodman, 150 Wn.2d 774 (circumstantial and direct evidence carry equal weight)
State v. Gallo, 20 Wn. App. 717 (intent may be inferred from surrounding circumstances)
State v. Abuan, 161 Wn. App. 135 (criminal intent can be inferred from conduct as logical probability)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecution must disclose materially favorable evidence)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (confrontation clause prohibits testimonial hearsay)
State v. Templeton, 148 Wn.2d 193 (state constitutional self-incrimination analysis)
State v. Glasmann, 183 Wn.2d 117 (state constitutional double jeopardy analysis)