State Of Washington v. Clifford Paul Lapointe, Jr.
75218-9
| Wash. Ct. App. | Nov 6, 2017Background
- In 2013 the legislature amended RCW 9A.52.100 to make vehicle prowling in the second degree a class C felony "upon a third or subsequent conviction," defining that term as having been "previously convicted at least two separate occasions."
- The statute also provides that multiple counts charged in the same charging document or based on the same date of occurrence do not count as separate offenses for purposes of felony charging.
- On December 9, 2013, LaPointe pleaded guilty in a single proceeding to three misdemeanors of vehicle prowling: two counts charged in one amended information (July and September incidents) and one count in a different cause number (May incident); sentencing occurred January 3, 2014.
- In 2016 the State charged LaPointe with felony vehicle prowling, alleging he had two prior convictions on separate occasions and not charged in the same charging document.
- LaPointe filed a Knapstad motion to dismiss, arguing his 2013 guilty pleas—entered the same day in the same proceeding—did not constitute convictions on two separate occasions; the trial court denied the motion and convicted him of the felony.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and concluded RCW 9A.52.100(3) is ambiguous as applied to these facts; applying the rule of lenity, it reversed the denial of the Knapstad motion and the felony conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether two guilty pleas entered the same day in one proceeding constitute "previously convicted at least two separate occasions" under RCW 9A.52.100(3) | LaPointe: No—pleas on same day/same proceeding are not convictions on two separate occasions | State: Yes—because the pleas were to counts in different charging documents and to incidents on different dates, they count as separate occasions under RCW 9A.52.100(4) | The court held they do not: pleas entered the same day in the same proceeding are not convictions on two separate occasions; reverse and remand. |
| Whether RCW 9A.52.100(4) compels treating those 2013 convictions as separate occasions | LaPointe: (implicit) (4) lists exceptions and does not broaden (3) to treat same-day same-proceeding pleas as separate | State: (relying on (4)) (4) shows legislature intended separate charging documents and different dates to qualify as separate occasions | The court rejected the State’s inverse reading of (4), finding (3) and (4) must be harmonized and (4) does not resolve the ambiguity in favor of the prosecution. |
| Proper interpretive rule where statutory language is ambiguous | LaPointe: Ambiguity should be resolved in defendant’s favor under rule of lenity | State: Legislative language and (4) clarify intent | Held: Because plain text and legislative history do not clearly resolve ambiguity, apply rule of lenity and construe statute for defendant. |
| Whether legislative history clarifies statutory ambiguity | LaPointe: Legislative history is not illuminating | State: Submitted bill reports | Held: Bill reports did not clarify intent; ambiguity remains and favors defendant. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Knapstad, 107 Wn.2d 346 (1986) (procedural vehicle for dismissal based on record defects in charging)
- State v. Kintz, 169 Wn.2d 537 (2010) (defining "separate occasions" as independent, distinct occurrences)
- State v. Bolar, 129 Wn.2d 361 (1996) (use of dictionary definitions to interpret undefined statutory terms)
- State v. Bluford, 195 Wn. App. 570 (2016) (holding guilty pleas entered same day are not convictions on two separate occasions for sentencing enhancement)
- State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186 (2013) (standard for statutory interpretation and examining legislative intent)