State Of Washington v. Christopher R. Johnson, 460 P.3d 1091

Undercover officers posted a Craigslist ad posing as a 13‑year‑old girl (“Brandi”); Christopher Johnson replied and engaged in explicit sexual conversation and offered to pay.
Johnson arranged a meeting, went to a minimart, then drove toward the purported house; he was arrested en route with $40.
He was convicted by a jury of attempted second‑degree rape of a child, attempted commercial sexual abuse of a minor, and communication with a minor for immoral purposes.
The trial court declined to give Johnson’s requested entrapment instruction; Johnson testified he thought the ad was an age‑role‑play and that he was ‘‘playing detective.’’
At sentencing counsel did not argue that the three convictions constituted the same criminal conduct, and the court imposed a community custody condition: do not access the World Wide Web unless authorized by the CCO through approved filters.
On appeal the court of appeals affirmed: no error in refusing the entrapment instruction, no ineffective assistance based on the same‑conduct omission, and the internet restriction was constitutional and not unconstitutionally vague.

Issue	State's Argument	Johnson's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court erred by refusing an entrapment jury instruction	No; record shows law enforcement only provided an opportunity, not inducement, and Johnson initiated and advanced the sexualized contact	Entrapment instruction required because government created the encounter and State did not disprove predisposition	Affirmed — no instruction; Johnson failed to meet burden to show inducement and lack of predisposition
Whether counsel was ineffective for not arguing the three convictions were the same criminal conduct at sentencing	Argument would have failed because each offense requires a different objective intent	The convictions arose from a single intent: to have sex with the person who posted the ad	Affirmed — no prejudice; offenses require distinct intents (intercourse, exchange for value, predatory sexual communication)
Whether the internet‑access community custody condition is unconstitutional (overbroad or vague)	Condition is tailored and reasonably necessary because the crimes were committed via the internet; CCO authorization with filters is a sufficiently ascertainable standard	Condition vests unbridled discretion in the CCO and chills protected First Amendment activity	Affirmed — condition is reasonably necessary, sensitively imposed, and not unconstitutionally vague

State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680 (2015) (standard for giving instructions on party’s theory of the case)
State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1 (1996) (elements of entrapment affirmative defense)
State v. Fisher, 185 Wn.2d 836 (2016) (defendant may not rely on State’s lack of evidence to meet burden for affirmative defenses)
State v. Condon, 182 Wn.2d 307 (2015) (abuse of discretion standard for instruction rulings)
State v. Harvill, 169 Wn.2d 254 (2010) (when evidence supports an affirmative defense, refusal to instruct may require reversal)
State v. Chenoweth, 185 Wn.2d 218 (2016) (same criminal conduct: separate statutory intents control analysis)
State v. Aldana‑Graciano, 176 Wn.2d 531 (2013) (narrow application of same criminal conduct doctrine)
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (blanket online‑access bans can be overbroad under the First Amendment)
United States v. Holena, 906 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2018) (probation internet restrictions and need for tailoring and clarity)
State v. Padilla, 190 Wn.2d 672 (2018) (vagueness test for community custody conditions)