State Of Washington v. Christopher Lambert
75424-6
| Wash. Ct. App. | Sep 18, 2017Background
- In 1986 Lambert (age 19) pleaded guilty to third-degree statutory rape based on sexual intercourse with a victim about 55 months younger. Sentencing occurred in 1987.
- Prior to July 1987, former RCW 9.94A.230(2) allowed a court discretion to vacate a statutory rape conviction after sentence completion and five conviction-free years.
- In July 1987 the legislature amended the law to prohibit vacatur for crimes listed as "crimes against persons," expressly including first, second, or third degree statutory rape and "any of these crimes as they may be renamed in the future."
- In 1988 statutory rape provisions were replaced by three degrees of "rape of a child," changing the age-related element (requiring the offender be at least 48 months older than the victim) and listing rape of a child among crimes against persons.
- In 2016 Lambert moved to vacate his 1986 conviction, arguing the 1988 amendments did not apply retroactively and thus his conviction remained vacatable; the trial court denied the motion, concluding the offense was a crime against a person and not vacatable.
- Lambert appealed; the Court of Appeals considered whether third-degree statutory rape is a non-vacatable crime against a person after the renaming/revision of the statute and whether his guilty plea established the elements of third-degree rape of a child.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lambert) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether third-degree statutory rape is a "crime against a person" that may not be vacated after the 1987–1988 amendments | The 1988 changes did not apply retroactively; third-degree statutory rape is not the same as third-degree rape of a child and thus remained vacatable | Legislature designated statutory rape as non-vacatable and the 1988 renaming to rape of a child retains the prohibition | Held: The offense was renamed and remains a non-vacatable crime against a person; prohibition applies |
| Whether the State proved elements of third-degree rape of a child for purposes of applying the non-vacatur rule | Argues the State did not prove the elements after the statutory change, so the prohibition cannot be applied | State contends Lambert’s guilty plea and record establish the elements (victim age and 48-month age difference) | Held: Lambert’s guilty plea and factual record establish the elements; the offense matches third-degree rape of a child |
| Whether Taylor (previous case) requires treating statutory rape as a sex-offense question that precludes application of the 1988 amendments | Relies on Taylor to argue the 1988 amendments (sex-offense regime) do not apply to his conviction | State distinguishes Taylor: that case concerned the statutory definition of "sex offense," not whether an offense is a "crime against a person" for vacatur purposes | Held: Taylor is inapposite; statutory rape qualifies as a crime against a person here |
| Whether Lambert had a vested right to vacatur because at plea time the offense was potentially vacatable | Lambert contends he relied on the then-existing vacatur availability and had a vested interest | State argues no vested right because Lambert had not satisfied conditions for vacatur before the 1987 change | Held: No vested right — Lambert had not completed the required conviction-free period before the statutory change |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Taylor, 162 Wn. App. 791 (reciting legislative renaming of statutory rape and addressing statutory interpretation)
- Honeycutt v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 197 Wn. App. 707 (legislative history may inform ambiguous statutes)
- Bostain v. Food Express, Inc., 159 Wn.2d 700 (use of legislative history in statutory interpretation)
- In re Carrier, 173 Wn.2d 791 (vesting requires a present fixed right of future enjoyment)
- State v. T.K., 139 Wn.2d 320 (limitations on vested-right claims after legislative change)
- Gillis v. King County, 42 Wn.2d 373 (defining vested rights)