State Of Washington v. Christina Ellen Bellah, 74213-2

In 2012 Christina Bellah was charged and convicted of trafficking in stolen property after pawning Sandra Brown’s jewelry under another name; Bellah claimed she believed the jewelry was Spencer’s and that Spencer had asked her to sell it.
Two defense witnesses were identified shortly before trial: Latisha Ferguson (Bellah’s niece) who was present when Spencer allegedly said the jewelry belonged to her, and Judy Brown (Bellah’s mother, living in Arizona) who allegedly would provide the same testimony.
On the Monday the trial began, Bellah moved for a continuance so Judy could travel from Arizona to testify and asked for public funds for her airfare; the court denied both requests as Judy’s testimony would be cumulative of Ferguson’s.
Pretrial the court granted the State’s motions to: (1) prohibit defense counsel from stating he represented an “innocent” client (vs. saying the client is presumed innocent) and (2) prohibit arguing the jury’s role is to protect individuals from the State. The court also excluded evidence of Spencer’s conviction for animal cruelty.
Bellah argued on appeal that these rulings deprived her of her right to present a defense; the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion or manifest constitutional error.

Issue	Bellah's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Denial of continuance to procure Judy Brown	Judy’s testimony was material and noncumulative; denial prevented presentation of defense	Judy’s testimony would be cumulative of Ferguson’s; denial within discretion	Denial affirmed — testimony would be cumulative; no prejudice shown
Denial of public funds for travel (CrR 3.1(f))	Funds necessary to bring Judy to testify; denial impaired defense	No need to fund travel for cumulative witness; discretion to deny	Denial affirmed — tied to continuance denial and cumulative nature
Limiting defense counsel’s trial statements (saying counsel represents an “innocent” person)	Counsel must be free to characterize defense and client; ruling chilled defense	Statement is an impermissible personal opinion on guilt or innocence	Affirmed — counsel may say client is ‘‘presumed innocent’’ but not give personal opinion
Precluding argument that jury’s role is to protect individuals from the State	Argument is valid statement of jury role and protects defendant rights	Equivalent to jury nullification argument and improper	Affirmed — court may restrict voir dire/opening/closing; such argument conflicts with court’s instructions

State v. Downing, 151 Wn.2d 265 (2004) (continuance decisions reviewed for abuse of discretion)
State v. Eller, 84 Wn.2d 90 (1974) (continuance/denial analysis; due process requires case-by-case review)
State v. Reed, 102 Wn.2d 140 (1984) (counsel may not state personal opinion on guilt or innocence)
State v. Bonisisio, 92 Wn. App. 783 (1998) (defendant not entitled to jury nullification instruction; limits on argument)
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (defendant’s right to present a defense is fundamental but subject to rules of evidence)