State Of Washington v. Charles S. Longshore, Iii, 47030-6

Background

On May 27–28, 2012 Charles Longshore went with Robert “Bobby” Raphael to a mobile home where Raphael sought payment from Anitrea Taber; Longshore carried Raphael’s gun. Longshore struck Taber with the gun, the gun discharged, then Longshore stepped back, shot Taber in the head, and then shot Tyler Drake. Both victims died. Raphael testified he did not intend killings and cooperated with the State in exchange for a plea deal.
Longshore was charged with two counts of aggravated first‑degree murder with special‑verdict aggravators (multiple victims/common scheme; killing to conceal another crime).
Longshore gave recorded statements to police on May 28, June 1, and June 4; he moved to suppress those statements and moved to dismiss for failure to preserve evidence (Raphael’s jail‑laundered clothing).
At trial the court admitted the May 28 and June 4 statements but admitted the June 1 statements; the court also instructed the jury with a WPIC accomplice‑credibility instruction and a definition of “accomplice.” The State disavowed accomplice liability but urged the cautionary credibility instruction for Raphael.
The jury convicted Longshore on both counts, found both aggravators, and the court sentenced him to life without parole. Longshore appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Longshore)	Held
Whether giving an accomplice instruction was proper	Instruction was a cautionary tool to test Raphael’s credibility; jury could view Raphael as an accomplice	No accomplice liability was alleged; evidence did not show Raphael was an accomplice to murder; instruction risked jury confusion	Court: Error to give accomplice definition/instruction; not harmless given jury question—reversed and remanded
Whether dismissal was required for failure to preserve Raphael’s clothing	Jail laundered clothing under policy; evidence at most "potentially useful," not clearly exculpatory; no bad faith	Clothing could have been tested; lack of preservation policy shows bad faith and prejudiced defense	Court: No due process violation; evidence was only potentially useful and no bad faith shown; denial of dismissal affirmed
Admissibility of statements: May 28	Statements made while not in custody; defendant was told he was free to leave and was a witness	Detective continued questioning after Longshore asked to stop; Miranda required because custody existed	Court: May 28 statements admissible—Longshore was not in custody and interview stopped after he asked to stop
Admissibility of statements: June 1	Statements admissible; defendant did not unequivocally and effectively invoke right to remain silent	Longshore unequivocally said “that concludes it” and “I already concluded…ten minutes ago,” so questioning should have stopped; subsequent questioning produced statements that should have been suppressed	Court: June 1 statements (after invocation) were improperly admitted; invocation of right to remain silent was unequivocal
Admissibility of statements: June 4	Statements admissible; defendant did not unequivocally invoke right to counsel when polygraph was discussed	Longshore sought counsel regarding polygraph and requested attorney involvement	Court: June 4 statements admissible—no unequivocal invocation of right to counsel
Sufficiency of evidence: premeditation and aggravators	State: evidence supports premeditation (brought a gun, struck then shot, comment “no witnesses”) and aggravators (common scheme to collect debt; concealment of assault/witnesses)	Longshore: insufficient evidence of premeditation and legally insufficient nexus for aggravators	Court: Evidence was sufficient to support premeditation and both aggravating circumstances

Key Cases Cited

State v. Rice, 102 Wn.2d 120 (instructional error presumed prejudicial)
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (police not strictly required to preserve potentially useful evidence absent bad faith)
State v. Wittenbarger, 124 Wn.2d 467 (material exculpatory vs. potentially useful evidence rule)
State v. Pirtle, 127 Wn.2d 628 (premeditation standard)
State v. Finch, 137 Wn.2d 792 (nexus/common scheme requirement for aggravator)
State v. Heritage, 152 Wn.2d 210 (custody/Miranda principles)
State v. Piatnitsky, 180 Wn.2d 407 (unequivocal invocation of right to remain silent)
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (postrequest responses cannot be used to undermine clarity of invocation)