State Of Washington, V Carlos Avalos, 49672-1

In February 2014, while serving a 10-year sentence, Carlos Avalos (age 19) stabbed a corrections officer multiple times with a metal shank; the officer required stitches and was on medical leave for 10 months. Avalos had prior similar assault convictions in juvenile detention.
Avalos was convicted of second-degree assault for the 2014 attack; the standard range was 53–70 months.
At the original March 2015 sentencing, defense counsel argued youth and solitary confinement as mitigating factors but conceded the sentence must run consecutively to prior terms; the court imposed 70 months (high end) consecutive.
Avalos’s sentence was vacated on unrelated grounds and remanded for resentencing. At the November 2016 resentencing counsel again argued mitigation but did not request an exceptional concurrent sentence or inform the court it had discretion to impose one.
The court again imposed 70 months consecutive. Avalos appealed, alleging sentencing error (failure to consider youthfulness as basis for an exceptional concurrent sentence) and ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request such a sentence.

Issue	Avalos' Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether the court abused its discretion by failing to consider youthfulness as a basis for an exceptional concurrent sentence (i.e., mitigating to run concurrently)	Court was required to consider youthfulness and could have imposed an exceptional concurrent sentence; failure to do so was an abuse	Court considered youthfulness and mitigation but was not required to impose an exceptional sentence; Avalos did not request an exceptional sentence and had conceded consecutivity	No abuse of discretion: court considered youthfulness, Avalos never requested an exceptional sentence, and sentencing within the standard range is generally not appealable
Whether defense counsel was ineffective for conceding consecutive sentencing and failing to request an exceptional concurrent sentence	Counsel’s concession and failure to cite O’Dell was deficient and prejudiced Avalos because the court might have imposed a concurrent sentence if asked	Even if counsel’s performance was deficient, Avalos was not prejudiced—court rejected mitigation and imposed the high-end standard-range sentence, so an exceptional concurrent sentence was not reasonably probable	Ineffective assistance claim fails for lack of prejudice: no reasonable probability the outcome would have been different

State v. Williams, 149 Wn.2d 143 (discusses limits on appellate review of standard-range sentences)
State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680 (youthfulness can be mitigating and sentencing court cannot categorically refuse to consider age)
State v. Houston‑Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1 (Eighth Amendment requires considering youth when juveniles are sentenced as adults)
State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333 (defendant entitled to ask court to consider an exceptional sentence and have the alternative actually considered)
State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17 (defines "reasonable probability" prejudice standard for Strickland analysis)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance requires deficient performance and prejudice)