State of Washington v. C.B.
33110-5
| Wash. Ct. App. | Aug 23, 2016Background
- Carter (a 14‑year‑old juvenile) dared friends Parker and Jared to "dingdong ditch" Melvin Harris's fenced home; he urged them to shout a racial slur when they rang the doorbell.
- The Harrises had a fully fenced front yard with a gate/sidewalk from the driveway to the porch; no "No Trespassing" signs but video surveillance signs were posted.
- Parker and Jared ran to the porch, rang the bell, and Jared shouted a racial epithet through an open window; all three boys fled.
- All were charged with second‑degree criminal trespass; Carter was charged as an accomplice. Diversion was considered and rejected; Carter moved to compel diversion and later moved to recuse the judge based on remarks made at the diversion hearing.
- After a bench trial the juvenile court found Carter guilty as an accomplice; Carter appealed challenging sufficiency of the evidence (scope of implied license to approach a home) and denial of recusal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Carter) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Jared and Parker had an implied common‑law license to approach the Harris front door for "dingdong ditch" conduct | Carter: implied license to approach a residential door allowed the conduct; absence of "No Trespassing" signs meant entry was lawful | State: implied license is limited by purpose and local custom; shouting a racial slur and fleeing exceeded the customary scope of the license | Court: License limited by purpose and custom; evidence supported that defendants exceeded the implied license — entry was unlawful |
| Whether the racial slur created a new speech‑based crime or implicated First Amendment protections | Carter: conviction improperly based on speech; protections for speech (no new notice; not "true threat"/"fighting words") | State: the prosecution relied on the slur only to show the unlicensed purpose and scope of the intrusion; criminality is conduct (unlawful entry), not protected speech | Court: First Amendment not implicated; speech was evidentiary of unlawful purpose, not the basis for a new crime |
| Sufficiency of evidence to convict Carter as an accomplice | Carter: insufficient proof that Parker/Jared committed an unlawful trespass or that Carter knowingly solicited it | State: testimony, surveillance, flight, and Parker's statement supported commission and Carter's solicitation/encouragement | Court: Substantial evidence supported findings, credibility determinations, and accomplice liability; conviction affirmed |
| Whether Judge Federspiel should have recused for bias based on pretrial comments | Carter: judge's remarks showed potential bias and violated appearance of fairness/due process | State: judge's comments were contextually reasonable, showed intent to follow law, and did not demonstrate disqualifying bias | Court: Denial of recusal was not an abuse of discretion; comments were candid but not disqualifying |
Key Cases Cited
- Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (discusses common‑law implied license to approach a home and limits based on purpose and scope)
- Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (knocker on the door treated as implied invitation to approach a residence)
- Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011) (approach to a home may be treated as what a private citizen could do; scope tied to customary behavior)
- Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (due process and judicial recusal standards at constitutional level)
- R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (limits on First Amendment protections do not immunize conduct that is criminal in form)
- State v. Homan, 181 Wn.2d 102 (2014) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence and appellate review of findings)
- Singleton v. Jackson, 935 P.2d 644 (Wash. App. 1997) (adopting Restatement approach recognizing local custom may create an implied license to approach a residence)