State Of Washington v. Brannon I. Jones, 48689-0

Tools worth over $3,000 were stolen from Michael and Chrystal Weld’s home; Michael Weld is the uncle of Brannon Jones.
Travis Delbrouck sold about 30 tools to Kelly Marks for ~$500; Marks later learned they were likely stolen and returned them to deputies.
Marks testified Jones was present and helped load tools; Delbrouck gave a prior statement saying he split proceeds with Jones.
Deputies located Jones; he fled, discarded a sweatshirt that contained methamphetamine, and after Miranda warnings admitted involvement but claimed he wasn’t paid and had been using meth.
Charges: first‑degree trafficking in stolen property, unlawful possession of methamphetamine, and third‑degree driving while license suspended; jury convicted on all counts.
At trial defense counsel did not object to (a) prosecution’s closing argument referring to Jones’s failure to come forward (pre‑arrest silence) or (b) the prosecutor’s substantive use of Delbrouck’s prior statement; at sentencing Jones did not object to imposition of discretionary LFOs.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Jones)	Held
Sufficiency of evidence as to "knowingly" trafficking in stolen property	Evidence (presence, low sale price, unusual location, Delbrouck’s statement, Jones’s admissions/flight) supports knowledge	At best Jones suspected a possibility the tools were stolen, not that he "knowingly" trafficked	Affirmed: Evidence sufficient to prove knowledge
Ineffective assistance — prosecutor relied on Jones’s pre‑arrest silence in closing	Argument was proper to show consciousness of guilt and flight	Invoking silence before arrest infringed Fifth Amendment; counsel should have objected	Counsel’s failure to object not prejudicial given strong evidence; claim fails
Ineffective assistance — prosecutor used Delbrouck’s prior statement as substantive evidence in closing	Statement was reliable and admitted without limitation, so prosecutorial use was proper	Prior statement could only be used for impeachment; counsel should have objected or sought limiting instruction	No deficiency: statement admitted for all purposes (no limiting instruction requested), so prosecutor’s argument was permissible
Discretionary LFOs — adequacy of ability‑to‑pay inquiry	Trial court implicitly found Jones capable; LFOs imposed	Court failed to conduct individualized Blazina inquiry into current/future ability to pay	Not reached on merits: Jones failed to preserve claim by not objecting and even requested LFOs; appellate review declined

State v. Drum, 168 Wn.2d 23 (2010) (standard for sufficiency of evidence review)
State v. Varga, 151 Wn.2d 179 (2004) (circumstantial evidence equals direct evidence for sufficiency)
State v. Cantu, 156 Wn.2d 819 (2007) (deference to jury on credibility and conflicting testimony)
State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322 (1995) (Strickland application in Washington; ineffective‑assistance review)
State v. McLean, 178 Wn. App. 236 (2013) (appellate treatment of unpreserved objection claims under Strickland)
In re Pers. Restraint of Cross, 180 Wn.2d 664 (2014) (presumption of counsel competence; scrutiny standard)
State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827 (2015) (requirement of individualized inquiry into ability to pay before imposing discretionary LFOs)
State v. Myers, 133 Wn.2d 26 (1997) (absent request, evidence admitted for one purpose is deemed admissible for others)
State v. Sua, 115 Wn. App. 29 (2003) (distinguishable: prior statement admitted only for impeachment with limiting instruction)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance test)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda warnings and admissibility of custodial statements)