State of Washington v. Brandon O. Keele, 33855-0

Early morning traffic stop on U.S. Route 2: Trooper Legros stopped a black Hyundai Tiburon for speeding; the driver fled when asked for ID.
High-speed pursuit by Trooper Dufour reached up to 130 mph; the Tiburon rammed Dufour's patrol car while reversing, then became disabled in yards and the driver fled on foot.
Vehicle owner Jeffrey Morris (passenger) initially told officers he was ~80% sure Brandon Keele was the driver; later recanted at trial.
Three officers (Legros, Dufour, Knouf) identified Keele from DOL/booking photos and placed him at or near the scene; Knouf also encountered a trespasser later who used an alias of Keele.
Keele testified to an alibi (in Tonasket at a barter fair) and showed tattoos he argued officers failed to describe; jury convicted him of second-degree assault, first-degree malicious mischief, and attempting to elude.
Keele appealed, challenging sufficiency of identity evidence, vagueness of the assault statute, trial counsel effectiveness, intent instruction, and sentencing overlap; the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of identity evidence	State: officers' eyewitness IDs, Morris's initial ID, vehicle tied to Morris, Keele's link to Morris suffice to prove identity	Keele: alibi, Morris's recantation, tattoos unexplained by officers, implausible IDs mean insufficient evidence	Affirmed: viewing evidence favorably to State, rational juror could find Keele was driver
Vagueness of 2nd-degree assault statute	Keele: relies on Johnson/Dimaya — statute vague under categorical approach	State: jury decided on facts/elements, no categorical-analysis vagueness problem here	Rejected Keele's vagueness claim; Johnson/Dimaya not implicated in these fact-based proceedings
Ineffective assistance of counsel	Keele: counsel failed to move to exclude booking photos, failed to object at trial, failed to develop tattoo/alibi corroboration, and to present ID expert	State: counsel had reasonable strategic reasons; many alleged omissions were nonprejudicial or speculative	Rejected: Keele did not show deficient performance or resulting prejudice; some remedies left for PRP if new evidence exists
Jury instruction on intent & same-conduct sentencing	Keele: court erred by not defining "intent" and convictions duplicate same criminal conduct	State: defense did not request definition; same-conduct challenge not timely raised	Rejected: no plain error (no request), and sentencing overlap cannot be asserted first on appeal

State v. Hill, 83 Wn.2d 558 (identification burden rests with State)
State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192 (sufficiency-of-evidence standard; view evidence in State's favor)
State v. Cordero, 170 Wn. App. 351 (deference to trier of fact on credibility)
State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322 (Strickland standard applied in Washington)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance two-prong test)
State v. Bea, 162 Wn. App. 570 (intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence)
State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682 (requirement to request jury definition of intent)