State of Washington v. Benjamin Gordon Swofford, Jr.
34745-1
| Wash. Ct. App. | Nov 16, 2017Background
- Late-night December 6, 2015: Swofford drove a minivan at high speed on gravel and city streets in foggy weather; an officer began pursuit with lights and siren.
- Swofford repeatedly braked when the officer neared, then accelerated and used oncoming lanes, forcing other drivers to pull over.
- Police deployed spike strips; Swofford ran them, puncturing tires, continued at ~60 mph, and was ultimately stopped when an officer struck his van.
- Swofford told officers he had "f---ed up," and said earlier he was hurrying because his stepdaughter had reportedly overdosed; defense sought to present necessity evidence to that effect.
- Jury convicted him of attempting to elude with an endangerment enhancement; trial court refused to admit necessity evidence and declined a common-law necessity instruction.
- On appeal Swofford challenged denial of necessity, alleged ineffective assistance for not requesting a willfulness instruction, and contested sufficiency of evidence for the conviction and enhancement; court affirmed but remanded to clarify community custody was not imposed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Swofford) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of necessity evidence / availability of common-law necessity | Necessity evidence was irrelevant and properly excluded; statutory affirmative defense governs. | Swofford sought to show he fled to render emergency aid to an overdosing stepdaughter, justifying necessity. | Evidence was irrelevant to statutory affirmative defense and did not satisfy common-law necessity (reasonable legal alternative existed); exclusion affirmed. |
| Instruction defining "willfully" / ineffective assistance | No error: counsel reasonably omitted the definitional instruction as trial tactic; omission not prejudicial. | Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request an instruction defining "willfully." | No deficient performance or prejudice shown; ineffective-assistance claim denied. |
| Sufficiency of evidence for attempting to elude | Evidence (evasive maneuvers, braking-accelerating, speeding, admission) supported willfulness/knowledge and guilt. | Insufficient direct proof he saw/heard officer; thus no willful failure to stop. | Circumstantial evidence allowed inference of knowledge/willfulness; conviction supported. |
| Sufficiency for endangerment enhancement | Driving endangered other motorists (illegal pass, forcing cars to pull over, high speeds, bridge spike area). | No proof any person was threatened with physical harm. | Jury could reasonably find multiple drivers were endangered; enhancement supported. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Luvene, 127 Wn.2d 690 (discretion in evidentiary rulings reviewed for abuse)
- State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12 (standard for abuse of discretion)
- State v. Diana, 24 Wn. App. 908 (recognition and limits of common-law necessity defense)
- State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d 614 (definition of "reckless" in traffic statutes)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two-prong test for ineffective assistance)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency of the evidence)
- State v. Flora, 160 Wn. App. 549 (willfulness definition in eluding context)
