State Of Washington, V Anthony Eugene Whitfield, 49469-8

Background

Whitfield was convicted in 2004 of 17 counts of first-degree assault with sexual motivation for having unprotected sex while HIV-positive; at least five partners reportedly contracted HIV.
He was sentenced within the standard range on all counts (total 2,137 months); he did not receive any statutory sentence enhancements or an exceptional sentence.
In 2016 Whitfield (pro se) moved under RCW 10.73.170 for postconviction DNA testing of the five victims who allegedly contracted HIV, arguing the viral strains would show he was not the source.
The trial court denied the RCW 10.73.170 motion; Whitfield appealed that denial and raised additional claims in a Statement of Additional Grounds (SAG).
The court considered whether "DNA evidence is material to . . . sentence enhancement" under RCW 10.73.170 and whether Whitfield met the statute’s procedural showing.

Issues

Issue	Whitfield’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Whether DNA testing is available because it is "material to a sentence enhancement" under RCW 10.73.170	DNA could show the five HIV-positive victims contracted a different strain, so transmission-based enhancement (or greater sentence) would not apply and testing is material	"Sentence enhancement" means a statutorily-mandated increase to the standard range (RCW 9.94A.533); Whitfield received only standard-range sentences, not enhancements	Denied: "sentence enhancement" is a term of art limited to statutorily-mandated increases; Whitfield did not receive such an enhancement, so RCW 10.73.170 relief is unavailable
Whether trial judge’s refusal to let Whitfield reply violated appearance of fairness, Canon 1, or due process	Judge’s refusal to let him reply denied fair process and showed bias	No evidence of actual or potential bias; no rule requires a reply; judge has authority to manage proceedings	Denied: no objective evidence of bias; claim lacks merit
Whether prosecutor committed misconduct at the DNA-motion hearing	Prosecutor misstated law, referenced trial, argued mootness, and claimed lack of jurisdiction over victims, prejudicing Whitfield	Prosecutor’s comments were either correct (transmission not basis of conviction) or harmless; Whitfield did not object and waived error	Denied: comments not improper or, if misstated, not so flagrant as to be incurable; claims lack merit
Whether court should consider spoliation and coercion claims based on evidence outside the record	Whitfield submitted exhibits and alleged spoliation and coerced testimony, requiring evidentiary hearing	Matters outside trial record cannot be considered on direct appeal; proper vehicle is a personal restraint petition	Not considered: claims rely on matters outside the record and thus were not reviewed on direct appeal

Key Cases Cited

State v. Crumpton, 181 Wn.2d 252 (2014) (RCW 10.73.170 limited to credible showings that DNA testing could benefit possibly innocent individuals)
State v. Thompson, 173 Wn.2d 865 (2012) (standard of review for RCW 10.73.170 motions generally abuse of discretion)
State v. Ervin, 169 Wn.2d 815 (2011) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo when central)
State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106 (2007) (primary goal of statutory interpretation is legislative intent; start with plain language)
State v. Delgado, 148 Wn.2d 723 (2003) (court will not add language to an unambiguous statute)
State v. Jones, 172 Wn.2d 236 (2011) (undefined statutory term given plain and ordinary meaning absent contrary intent)
State v. Veliz, 176 Wn.2d 849 (2013) (where term is a term of art, court uses technical definition)
State v. Gassman, 175 Wn.2d 208 (2012) (trial court’s inherent authority to manage proceedings)