381 P.3d 187
Wash. Ct. App.2016Background
- Late on October 4, 2014, Anthony Joseph was found asleep in an unlocked Chevy Blazer parked on a public street near Ellensburg’s vehicle impound lot.
- An officer awakened and detained Joseph after he could not identify or prove permission from the vehicle owner; Joseph admitted he lacked permission.
- Prosecutor charged assault (third degree) and vehicle prowling; trial proceeded to jury.
- Trial court, over defense objection, instructed the jury on second degree criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of vehicle prowling; the court declined to define “premises” but permitted argument.
- Jury acquitted Joseph of vehicle prowling, convicted him of second degree criminal trespass and third degree assault; Joseph appealed only the trespass conviction, arguing the trespass statute does not apply to vehicles.
Issues
| Issue | Joseph's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a vehicle qualifies as "premises" under the second degree criminal trespass statute | "Premises" does not include vehicles; statute therefore does not apply to sleeping in a vehicle | "Premises" includes vehicles via the criminal-code definition of "building" and the broad scope of second-degree trespass | Court held a vehicle is a "premises" for second degree trespass; affirmed conviction |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Martell, 22 Wn. App. 415 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (identified equal protection problem from overlapping trespass statutes)
- State v. Brown, 50 Wn. App. 873 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (interpreted legislative history to limit "building" in first-degree trespass to ordinary meaning)
- State v. Workman, 90 Wn.2d 443 (Wash. 1978) (test for lesser included offenses)
- State v. Mounsey, 31 Wn. App. 511 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (applied criminal-code definition of "building" to trespass context)
- State v. Brittain, 38 Wn. App. 740 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (noting second degree trespass applies broadly outside buildings)
- State v. Shelby, 61 Wn. App. 214 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (discussion indicating second degree trespass does not apply to vehicles in equal-protection context)