State Of Washington v. Andrew Yin Shing Wong, 74231-1

Background

Police found a white Honda reported stolen; officer observed a male driver matching Wong’s description flee the vehicle and shortly thereafter encountered Wong near a 7‑Eleven.
Officer found shaved (bump) keys, black gloves, WA ID and a driver’s license on Wong; the Honda was running with no key in ignition.
Wong told officers he was an automotive technician and had been dropped off by a friend named “Chris” but could not provide a last name or contact info.
Owner of the Honda testified the car and gloves/keys were not his and Wong had no permission to use the vehicle.
Wong did not testify. Prosecutor’s closing/rebuttal comments: called Wong’s narrative “bologna,” used a refrigerator‑light analogy for reasonable doubt, and told jurors they could not consider punishment or downside in reaching verdict.
Jury convicted Wong of possession of a stolen vehicle; Wong appealed claiming prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to object/move for a mistrial.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Wong)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether prosecutor improperly expressed personal opinion/disparaged Wong’s narrative	Prosecutor injected personal belief by calling Wong’s story “bologna” and “nonsense,” attacking credibility	Statements were reasonable inferences from trial evidence, not personal opinion	Court: No misconduct—comments were inferentially based on evidence and not prejudicial
Whether prosecutor trivialized the beyond‑reasonable‑doubt standard	Refrigerator‑light analogy reduced the State’s burden and undermined presumption of innocence	Analogy explained that circumstantial evidence can establish required certainty; not comparable to everyday decision analogies disapproved in other cases	Court: Analogy permissible explanation of certainty re circumstantial evidence; no incurable prejudice (no objection below)
Whether prosecutor improperly minimized jury’s role by suggesting no downside to conviction	Argued prosecutor misstated that conviction carries no downside, diminishing jury’s role and fairness	Prosecutor properly explained jury must not consider punishment or collateral effects per instruction; comment was responsive to defense closing	Court: Held permissible explanatory remark in rebuttal and within proper scope; not shown flagrant or incurable error
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting/moving for mistrial	Counsel should have objected to burden‑of‑proof and punishment comments or moved for new trial	Counsel not deficient because remarks were proper; no prejudice shown	Court: No ineffective assistance—no deficient performance or prejudice under Strickland

Key Cases Cited

In re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d 696 (2012) (prosecutor may not express personal opinion on guilt/credibility)
State v. Fisher, 165 Wn.2d 727 (2009) (prosecutors are quasi‑judicial officers with duty to temper zeal)
State v. Lindsay, 180 Wn.2d 423 (2014) (two‑prong test for prosecutorial misconduct: improper + prejudice)
State v. Thorgerson, 172 Wn.2d 438 (2011) (wide latitude for arguing inferences; prejudice standard)
State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24 (1994) (unobjected‑to prosecutorial remarks reversible only if flagrant and incurable)
State v. Ish, 170 Wn.2d 189 (2010) (when prosecutor’s statements constitute improper personal opinion)
State v. McKenzie, 157 Wn.2d 44 (2006) (distinguishing argument from clear personal opinion)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
State v. West, 139 Wn.2d 37 (1999) (applying Strickland in Washington)
State v. Greiff, 141 Wn.2d 910 (2000) (cumulative error doctrine threshold)