237 A.3d 648
Vt.2020Background
- In March 2015 police responded to a call at defendant Christina Allcock’s home where a man had been stabbed; defendant, relatives, and her son were present.
- Outside on the driveway in the father’s car, an officer tried to speak to defendant’s son; defendant resisted and allegedly wrapped her arms around the son, scratched/gouged the officer’s hands, punched him in the mouth, and held a lit cigarette lighter to the officer’s hand.
- Charges: aggravated assault on a police officer (based on the lighter burn), simple assault on a police officer, and impeding a police officer; a jury convicted on all counts.
- The State introduced Facebook private messages purportedly from Allcock admitting use of a lighter; the Facebook Business Record was produced to police under warrant but no witness tied IPs/emails to Allcock and the message recipient did not testify.
- Trial court admitted the Facebook messages as authenticated; defendant moved for a new trial and a judgment of acquittal; the court denied both motions and sentenced defendant.
- On appeal the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the aggravated-assault conviction for improper authentication of the Facebook messages and affirmed the impeding conviction (relating to a midtrial addition of “slapping” in the jury instruction).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Facebook messages were properly authenticated for admission | Normal Rule 901 standards suffice; Facebook Business Record + warrant + content and police investigation provided enough foundation | Social media easily faked; State offered no IP/email link, recipient didn’t testify, and content evidence was insufficient to show authorship | Social-media evidence is authenticated under Rule 901, but admission here was an abuse of discretion because the State failed to present sufficient foundational proof; aggravated-assault conviction reversed |
| Whether court erred by effectively amending the impeding charge by adding “slapping” after close of evidence | Inclusion didn’t add a new offense; affidavit and trial testimony provided notice; amendment did not prejudice defendant | Defendant lacked fair notice and was prejudiced because the information/affidavit did not explicitly allege “slapping” | No abuse of discretion; amendment did not charge a different crime and defendant was on notice from affidavit and testimony; impeding conviction affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Kelley, 148 A.3d 191 (discussing preliminary authentication standard under V.R.E. 901 and leaving final authenticity to the jury)
- State v. Muscari, 807 A.2d 407 (trial-court evidentiary rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125 (2d Cir.) (framework for authenticating social-media evidence under traditional rules)
- Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682 (holding existing evidentiary rules adequate to authenticate social-media posts)
- Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. Crim. App.) (same; no special heightened test required)
- Sublet v. State, 113 A.3d 695 (Md.) (discussing concerns about social-media forgery and standards for authentication)
