State of Texas v. Wilson, Carolyn Sue Krizan
354 S.W.3d 808
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2011Background
- Appellee Krizan-Wilson's husband was murdered in 1985; she was indicted for murder in 2008, about 23 years later.
- Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment on grounds that pre-indictment delay violated due process, due course of law, and fair trial rights.
- Evidentiary hearing showed initial prosecutors believed case unwinnable; later prosecutors 23 years later pursued the case with new theories.
- Evidence presented showed prejudice: loss of defense files, destroyed medical records, faded memories, and unavailable witnesses.
- Court of Appeals reversed dismissal; Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the 23-year pre-indictment delay violate due process | Krizan-Wilson argues delay was impermissibly purposeful to gain an advantage | State contends delay lacked bad faith purpose; prejudice alone does not prove due process violation | No due-process violation; 23-year delay does not offend due process |
| What standard governs review of trial-court findings on delay purpose | Trial-court findings are factual and deserve abuse-of-discretion review | Correct standard is abuse of discretion, and court should defer to factual findings | Appellate review applied proper deference; no evidence of improper purpose found |
| Was the state's delay proven to be for purposes of gaining a tactical advantage | There was testimony suggesting bad faith to delay prosecution | Delay arose from differing opinions, not bad faith; bigamy charge shown as routine tactic, not ill intent | Second prong not satisfied; prejudice alone insufficient without proof of bad faith or improper purpose |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) (due-process analysis for pre-indictment delay; prejudice and purpose considered)
- United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977) (prosecutorial delay not penalized absent improper purpose; weighs interests of all parties)
- Ibarra v. State, 11 S.W.3d 189 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (two-pronged due-process framework requiring prejudice and intentional delay)
- Spence v. State, 795 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (prejudice proof required; intentional delay designed to gain tactical advantage)
- Crouch v. State, 84 F.3d 1497 (5th Cir. 1996) (federal circuit balancing approach to delay and prejudice)
- Townley v. United States, 665 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1982) (pre-indictment delay framework addressing prejudice and purpose)