597 S.W.3d 835
Tex.2020Background
- Thirteen-year-old R.R.S. admitted he sexually assaulted his five-year-old twin brothers; the State filed a delinquency petition alleging two aggravated sexual-assault acts.
- R.R.S., represented by counsel, signed a written stipulation and pleaded “true”; the trial court admonished him and entered an adjudication finding delinquency and set a disposition hearing.
- Before disposition, R.R.S. obtained new counsel and moved to withdraw the stipulation and get a new trial, asserting he was not informed of defenses (including an alleged defense based on inability to consent) and collateral consequences.
- The trial court denied the motion; it placed R.R.S. on intensive supervised probation and deferred any sex‑offender registration decision.
- The court of appeals reversed, holding the plea was not knowing and voluntary because (it held) In re B.W.—which held children under 14 cannot legally consent to sex—should have been disclosed as a defense applicable to aggravated sexual assault.
- The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals: B.W. does not bar adjudication for aggravated sexual assault because that offense does not require the accused’s agreement with the victim; the plea was knowing and voluntary and the stipulation/admission sufficed to support adjudication.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (R.R.S.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether In re B.W. (children lack legal capacity to consent) bars prosecution/adjudication for aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 | B.W. is limited to offenses that require the accused’s agreement (e.g., prostitution); aggravated sexual assault does not require the accused to have secured the victim’s agreement, so B.W. does not apply | B.W. establishes that a child under 14 cannot consent to sex, so that incapacity is a defense to offenses that include consent as an element, and counsel should have advised him | Held for State: B.W. does not render a child incapable of committing aggravated sexual assault because that offense does not require the accused’s agreement/consent element |
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying withdrawal of plea because R.R.S. was not informed of potential defenses | The trial court properly admonished R.R.S.; defense based on B.W. did not apply; juvenile bears burden to show plea was involuntary | R.R.S. said he lacked adequate information about defenses (including B.W.) and collateral consequences, so his plea wasn’t knowing and voluntary | Held for State: no abuse of discretion; R.R.S. failed to show the plea was involuntary |
| Whether failure to advise of possible sex‑offender registration renders plea involuntary | Registration is a collateral consequence; ignorance of collateral consequences does not invalidate a plea | He was not told registration could be required and that omission affected voluntariness | Held for State: registration is collateral; lack of admonishment about it does not render plea involuntary |
| Whether the stipulation/admission and record evidence were legally sufficient to support adjudication | A written stipulation and oral admission after proper admonishments are sufficient to support adjudication | The stipulation was insufficient because juvenile misunderstood defenses and consequences | Held for State: stipulation/admission (with proper admonitions) is sufficient; evidence supported adjudication |
Key Cases Cited
- In re B.W., 313 S.W.3d 818 (Tex. 2010) (children under 14 lack legal capacity to consent to sex; applied to prostitution charge)
- Jackson v. State, 590 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (trial court discretion over allowing withdrawal of plea)
- Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (defendant must show plea involuntary despite proper admonishments)
- Hernandez v. State, 861 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (consent is not an element for sexual assault under statutory provision when victim is a child)
- Anderson v. State, 182 S.W.3d 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (sex‑offender registration is a collateral consequence; failure to admonish does not necessarily render plea involuntary)
- Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (a defendant fully advised of direct consequences is not relieved by ignorance of collateral consequences)
- Cornet v. State, 417 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (distinguishing statutory intent requirement from medical‑care justifications)
- In re M.C.S., Jr., 327 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010) (juvenile’s stipulation/admission is sufficient to support adjudication)