State of Texas v. Jackson, John Berry
464 S.W.3d 724
Tex. Crim. App.2015Background
- Investigator Sides obtained a Texas court order (under Art. 18.21 §14) and installed a GPS tracker on Jackson’s Dodge Charger based on reasonable-suspicion allegations of drug trafficking.
- GPS alerted Sides when Jackson left Mitchell County and showed the Charger travelling consistently 3–4 mph over the limit; Sides paced the Charger to confirm speed.
- Deputy Clark (aware of the narcotics investigation) also verified speeding by radar and stopped Jackson; Jackson verbally consented to a vehicle search.
- Officers found ~2 ounces of methamphetamine in the trunk; Jackson was arrested and confessed at the station after Miranda warnings.
- Trial court suppressed the drugs and confession as fruit of the warrantless GPS search (relying on Jones); the court of appeals affirmed.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed: it held the officers’ independent verification of speeding was an intervening circumstance that attenuated the taint of the illegal GPS tracking because the misconduct was not purposeful or flagrant.
Issues
| Issue | State (Plaintiff) Argument | Jackson (Defendant) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence (drugs and confession) must be suppressed as fruit of the warrantless GPS tracking | Independent verification of speeding (pacing and radar) and voluntary consent are intervening events that attenuate the taint, so evidence is admissible | GPS installation/monitoring was an illegal search; the subsequent stop, consent, and incriminating evidence are but‑for products of that illegality and must be suppressed | Reversed court of appeals: verification of speeding was an intervening circumstance; because officers did not flagrantly or purposely violate rights, attenuation occurred and evidence is admissible |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (installation and use of GPS tracking device constitutes a Fourth Amendment search)
- State v. Mazuca, 375 S.W.3d 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (framework for applying Brown factors and when an intervening circumstance shifts emphasis to purpose/flagrancy)
- Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (three-factor attenuation test: temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, and purpose/flagrancy)
- Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (evidence is excluded only if obtained by exploitation of illegality; distinguishes but‑for causation)