State of Tennessee v. William Whitlow Davis, Jr.
2016 Tenn. LEXIS 91
| Tenn. | 2016Background
- On Oct. 23, 2009, Officer Jerry Massey received a BOLO for a green BMW allegedly with a loaded handgun and an impaired driver; ~25 minutes later he saw the BMW on a curvy two-lane road (Keller Bend Road).
- Massey followed the BMW and observed it cross the double-yellow center line with its two left wheels while negotiating a right-hand curve; he also paced the car and believed it exceeded the posted speed limit.
- Massey activated his cruiser camera, observed another center-line crossing on video, activated emergency lights, and stopped the driver; he smelled alcohol and noted slurred speech.
- The driver (Davis) was charged with DUI and a lane-violation; he moved to suppress the stop as unconstitutional. The trial court denied suppression, finding a violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-115.
- Davis pleaded guilty to DUI while reserving a certified question about the legality of the stop; the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, and the Tennessee Supreme Court granted review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether observing a one-time crossing of the double-yellow center line provides probable cause to stop under Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-115 | State: a vehicle crossing the center line (absent statutory exceptions) violates § 55-8-115 and creates probable cause for a stop | Davis: a slight or momentary crossing does not necessarily violate § 55-8-115 and thus cannot justify the seizure | Held: Crossing the center line even once (absent the four statutory exceptions) violates § 55-8-115 and supplies probable cause for a traffic stop |
| Whether the officer needed to charge the motorist under the exact statute the officer cited at the time of stop | State: officer’s subjective basis or later charging decision is irrelevant if facts known provided probable cause | Davis: challenged because he was not charged under § 55-8-115 but under § 55-8-123 | Held: It is irrelevant which specific statute the officer or prosecutor cites; probable cause is assessed from facts known at the time of seizure |
| Whether the stop could instead rest on reasonable suspicion of DUI | State: argued alternatively that officer had reasonable suspicion of DUI based on driving and BOLO | Davis: contested legality of seizure absent proper basis | Held: Court declined to decide reasonable-suspicion-as-DUI here because probable cause under § 55-8-115 was dispositive; reiterated distinctions between probable cause and reasonable suspicion |
| Whether a single crossing must be repeated to justify a stop | State: one crossing suffices; requiring multiple crossings would be arbitrary | Davis: urged that momentary or de minimis crossing should not be treated as misdemeanor | Held: One crossing is sufficient to establish a § 55-8-115 violation for probable-cause purposes (but officers retain discretion whether to stop) |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266 (Tenn. 2012) (probable-cause standard explained)
- State v. Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d 730 (Tenn. 1997) (observation of traffic violations can create probable cause to stop)
- State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215 (Tenn. 2000) (distinguishing slight weaving that did not violate rules of the road)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (subjective intent of officer is irrelevant once probable cause exists)
- Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (definition of probable cause)
- State v. Widdicombe, 85 P.3d 1271 (Mont. 2004) (statute prohibiting crossing center line construed to prohibit even brief crossings)
- State v. Huffman, 340 P.3d 903 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (single tire-width crossing of center line supports stop)