State of Tennessee v. Westley A. Albright, M2016-01217-CCA-R3-CD

Background

Albright pled nolo contendere to solicitation of a minor (Class E) in exchange for dismissal of a related charge, a one-year suspended sentence, and deferred judicial diversion; sex-offender treatment and registration were special conditions of probation.
He signed and initialed the Specialized Probation Conditions for Sex Offenders, which required attendance, participation, payment for treatment, and continuation until the provider (in consultation with the probation officer) certified satisfactory completion in writing.
Albright selected an approved provider (J. Barry Welch). The treatment plan listed objective goals including admission to the elements of the offense, a written statement of responsibility, and a sexual autobiography to be verified by polygraph.
Albright attended groups but repeatedly denied intent to commit a sex offense; he failed a specific-incident polygraph and would not provide a credible explanation; the provider discharged him for noncompliance with treatment goals.
Probation officer sought a revocation warrant alleging violation of Specialized Condition No. 3; trial court found Albright violated probation, revoked his diversion, adjudicated him guilty, and extended probation six months to allow completion of treatment. Albright appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Albright)	Held
1. Whether Albright was entitled to notice that admitting guilt was a condition of probation	Albright was on notice of treatment requirements; he signed and initialed the specialized conditions and was told treatment could end if provider certified completion or otherwise	Albright lacked due-process notice that confession/admission of guilt was required as a condition of his probation when he entered his nolo plea	Court: No relief — Albright had sufficient notice of treatment obligations and a reasonable person would understand treatment requires honesty; Edith Mae Gillman distinguished
2. Whether revocation relied on a probation rule not in the warrant (notice issue)	Warrant informed Albright he was discharged for noncompliance with Specialized Condition No. 3; he had opportunity to challenge evidence at hearing	Albright argued the court relied on Probation Rule No. 10 at oral ruling, which was not in the written warrant, depriving him of proper notice	Court: No relief — written warrant tracked Special Condition No. 3; Albright knew discharge from treatment was the charged violation and had access to evidence
3. Whether discharge for provider's subjective judgment (dishonesty) can support revocation when objective requirements were met	Provider testimony showed Albright failed objective program goals (admissions, sexual autobiography, sexual history) and dishonesty impeded progress; court accredited that testimony	Albright argued he met objective requirements (attendance, payment) and was unfairly discharged based on provider’s subjective view	Court: No relief — record shows he failed to meet any objective treatment goals; substantial evidence supports revocation
4. Standard of review for revocation	Revocation must be supported by preponderance; appellate review is abuse of discretion	Albright urged errors of law and insufficient evidence	Court: Applied abuse-of-discretion; found no abuse because substantial evidence supported trial court findings

Key Cases Cited

State v. Stubblefield, 953 S.W.2d 223 (Tenn. Crim. App.) (defendant on probation has liberty interest; reasonable notice required)
State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn.) (probation revocation reviewed for abuse of discretion)
Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606 (U.S. 1985) (revocation hearings need not provide full criminal-trial rights)
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (U.S. 1973) (minimum due-process rights in probation revocation)
State v. Shaffer, 45 S.W.3d 553 (Tenn.) (abuse-of-discretion/standard for overturning revocation)
State v. Reams, 265 S.W.3d 427 (Tenn. Crim. App.) (discharge from sex-offender treatment for dishonesty can support revocation)
Williams v. City of Burns, 465 S.W.3d 96 (Tenn.) (courts speak through written orders)