State of Tennessee v. Walter Townsend
W2015-02415-CCA-R3-CD
| Tenn. Crim. App. | Apr 13, 2017Background
- Defendant Walter Townsend, aged 82, groped his 25-year-old neighbor in Townsend's garage after inviting him inside.
- Townsend pled nolo contendere to sexual battery, a Class E felony, and was placed on eighteen months of judicial diversion under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-313.
- The trial court did not require Townsend to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act.
- The State appealed, arguing the Act compelled registration because Townsend was convicted of a sexual offense via diversion.
- The defense argued judicial diversion-lifted conviction means no conviction for purposes of the Act; no registration required.
- The appellate court held the trial court properly declined to require Townsend to register.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Act requires registration despite judicial diversion. | Townsend (State) contends diversionary conviction triggers registration. | Townsend argues no conviction occurs during diversion, so no registration. | No registration required; conflict resolved in Townsend's favor. |
| Whether there is a conflict between judicial diversion and the Act that nullifies the court's discretion. | Act mandates registration for sexual offenses; diversion does not override. | Diversion keeps no judgment of guilt, so no conviction under the Act. | Conflict acknowledged but not necessary to resolve for this case; court affirmed not registering. |
| What standard governs review of a trial court's decision on judicial diversion and registration. | Abuse of discretion to deny registration. | Court properly applied judicial diversion factors under Tenn. law. | De novo review; court applied factors and upheld diversion without mandatory registration. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. King, 432 S.W.3d 316 (Tenn. 2014) (describes abuse-of-discretion standard for judicial diversion with presumption of reasonableness)
- State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 945 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (factors for judicial diversion noted in Electroplating lineage)
- State v. Electroplating, Inc., 990 S.W.2d 211 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (establishes factors for judicial diversion consideration)
- State v. Bonestel, 871 S.W.2d 168 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (affirms weighing of diversion factors)
- State v. Dycus, 456 S.W.3d 918 (Tenn. 2015) (statutory construction and de novo review guidance)